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ABSTRACT
Three experiments were conducted on normal functioning undergraduate
university students to examine the role of configural processing in a set of living and non
living items. In Experiment 1 the participants were required to indicate whether a line
drawing matched a word that preceded it. Half of the pictures depicted animals and half
depicted clothing. Each picture was presented once in the upright position and once in the
inverted position. The results indicated that inversion of the pictures of animals increased
reaction times (RTs) more than inversion of the pictures of clothing, compared to pictures
presented in the upright orientation. In Experiment 2 participants were required to
categorize the same set of pictures used in Experiment 1. The pictures were again
presented in upright and inverted orientations. In contrast to Experiment 1 inversion of
the pictures increased RTs equally for the animals and the clothing. In Experiment 3
participants performed the same task as in Experiment 1. However, instead of clothing,
pictures of non-living items that were hypothesized to encourage configural processing
were used. Inversion of the pictures increased RTs equally for the animals and the set of
non-living items.
The results are conceptualized as supporting the hypothesis that living things are
processed more configurally than are non-living artefacts because of visual crowding
(Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987) within the category of living things. The relevance of
these findings to semantic category deficits for living things is discussed. It is
hypothesized that damage to a part of the brain necessary for processing the configural
relationships of objects can account for some of the instances of category specific deficits
for living things.
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental subject of inquiry, not just for psychology but for all social and
biological science, involves the organization of information in the brain. Perhaps some of
the most informative neuropsychological findings concerning this issue come from
patients who can recognize some categories of objects but not others. Warrington and
Shallice (1984) described a patient who sustained temporal lobe damage following herpes
simplex encephalitis and was able to name and give accurate descriptions of nonliving
artefacts, but had very limited knowledge for living things. For example, the patient was
able to describe a compass as “tools for telling the direction you are going” and a
briefcase as “a small case used by students to carry papers.” However, when asked to
describe a parrot he said, “don’t know,” and for a snail he responded “an insect animal.”
The above examples are used to illustrate the presence of an overall pattern of
impaired semantic knowledge for living things with preserved knowledge for nonliving
things. Other patients present with the opposite pattern of results, specifically intact
knowledge for living things and impaired knowledge for nonliving artefacts. This double
dissociation has been observed for a number of different categories of knowledge. The
symptoms of the first group of patients dissociate knowledge for living things from
knowledge of other objects, and symptoms of the second group dissociate knowledge for
nonliving artefacts from that of living things.
Other neuropsychological double dissociations that have been observed include
ones for common vs. proper names, nouns vs. verbs, and abstract vs. concrete words. The
presence of these double dissociations has been taken as evidence that different neural
substrates underlie the processing of each. However, as Van Orden, Pennington, and
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Stone (2001) state, the hypothesis that double dissociations indicate that different neural
substrates are responsible for performing different cognitive processes is predicated on
the assumption of modularity of brain functions. In contrast, many researchers have made
the logical mistake of accepting the occurrence of double dissociations as proof of
modularity. Van Orden et al. (2001) critique not only the application of double
dissociations to theories of modularity, but the pursuit of defining neuropsychological
modules at all. Firstly, modularity theories fail to explicate criteria necessary for the
definition of pure case dissociations. Thus, the characteristics that define pure lesions of
any module are not clear since the existence of the module is based on the presentation of
cases. This results in the constant pursuit of a pure case and an inevitable expansion of
exclusionary criteria. Secondly, because modularity places no limit on the number of
fractionations, dissociations translate into increasingly more fine-grained modules. For
example, an initial dissociation observed between nouns and verbs led to an observed
fractionation between living and non-living things, which has now been further
fractionated within the living things category to distinguish among animals, plants, and
body parts.
Van Orden et al’s (2001) compelling arguments notwithstanding, the investigation
into double dissociations has had some practical utility in providing direction for
understanding the organization of the mind and brain. Furthermore, investigating the
dissociation observed between living and non-living artefacts does not require the
acceptance of the modularity hypothesis. Quite the contrary, studies conducted in this
area have been aimed at distinguishing between predictions made by several modular
theories, connectionist theories, and theories that argue that the dissociation occurs as a
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function of stimulus properties and not of brain organization. Thus, the modular
hypothesis of living and non-living artefacts is being tested rather than assumed.
The distinction between living and non-living things has encouraged a great deal
of research involving the theoretical underpinnings of category specific deficits for a
number of reasons. Firstly, results initially presented by Warrington and Shallice (1984)
and subsequently corroborated by numerous studies (Basso, Capitani, & Laiacona, 1988;
Caramazza& Shelton, 1998; De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994; Farah & Wallace, 1992;
Humphreys & Riddoch, 1988; Kolinsky et al. 2001; Laiacona, Capitani, & Barbarotto,
1997; Silveri & Gainotti, 1988) were very persuasive and consistent across different
testing conditions. Secondly, these results inspired the development of a very influential
theory by Warrington and Shallice (1984) that suggested that the living/non-living
dissociation was actually a product of the differential weightings of visual-perceptual and
functional attributes between living and non-living items. For instance, the identification
of a living thing will depend primarily on its visual features, whereas identification of a
non-living artefact such as a tool will rely less on visual and more on functional
attributes. Finally, researchers took particular note of the living/non-living dichotomy
presented by Warrington and Shallice (1984) because it was reported in 4 patients
recovering from Herpes Simplex Encephalitis (HSE). This suggests that HSE results in a
particular pattern of brain pathology that can be associated with a specific pattern of
deficits. Such a link was seen to hold promise for establishing specific neuro-anatomical
correlates to well defined cognitive processes.
Warrington and Shallice’s (1984) theory also prompted a great deal of research
activity aimed at challenging its predictions which in turn gave rise to the development of
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alternative explanations of the living/non-living dichotomy. Caramazza and Shelton
(1998) argued that the dissociation between living and non-living artefacts occurs
because they are represented in the brain by distinct neurological structures. They
suggested that evolutionary pressures resulted in neural structures that are dedicated
strictly to the processing of information from living items. Gonnerman, Anderson, and
Devlin (1997), on the other hand, suggested that the dissociation between living and non
living artefacts occurs because of a different number of interconnections between sensory
and functional attributes in these categories, rather than a differential weighting of
sensory and functional attributes. Humphreys and Forde (2001) proposed the hierarchical
interactive theory (HIT) in which categorical deficits arise because of greater visual and
semantic similarity between categories of living items than between categories of
nonliving things. Each of the above theories will be discussed in greater detail following
a brief overview of the literature regarding the nature of semantic information in the
human brain. Most relevant to this dissertation is a consideration of whether semantic
information is represented in separate stores related to the modality of input (a separate
store for visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, motor, and verbal inputs) or in a single
unitary semantic system that is amodal.
Unitary Versus Multiple Semantic Systems
Patients with category-specific deficits such as those described above do not
appear to have difficulties that are confined to problems within a specific sensory
modality, but are instead found for particular categories on questioning across multiple
sensory modalities. Such generality suggests that the deficits relate to semantic memory
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and findings from these patients have been used to inform theories of the nature of
semantic memory.
Semantic memory has traditionally been defined as the system responsible for
storing information about the meanings of objects, concepts, and facts. For example, our
semantic memory system contains the knowledge that a dog has fur, ears, eyes, a snout,
and that it barks, is often walked with a leash, and can be used as a seeing-eye-dog. Some
of this knowledge represents visual features, auditory features, motor features, and
associations to other objects. A rudimentary analysis of the “contents” of what we refer to
as semantic memory suggests that this is not a unitary system, but an interaction of
systems that involve aspects o f visual memory, auditory memory, motor memory, and
verbal memory. However, the existence of category-specific deficits has led researchers
to reconsider the possibility of a unitary semantic store.
Supporters of the single semantic system models suggest that information within
semantic memory is amodal and that memory for sensorial features is accomplished by
pre-semantic systems that hold modality specific information. Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp,
and Romani (1990) argue that evidence that has been cited in favour of the multiple
semantics hypothesis is equally compatible with variants of the single semantic system
model. For instance, Shallice (1988) described three lines of evidence in support of a
multiple semantic system model: 1) the existence of patients who show poor naming
abilities that are restricted to one modality of input, despite evidence to suggest that
access to semantic information through that modality is intact; 2) disproportionate
memory impairments in one modality over another; and 3) the fact that individual’s
response times are helped more by priming within one modality than priming within
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another. In the multiple semantic system model it is hypothesized, based on the above
findings, that different parts (modalities) of the semantic system can be accessed, without
necessarily accessing the other parts; a phenomenon that Caramazza et al. (1990) termed
“privileged access”.
Caramazza et al. (1990) suggest, however, that a unitary semantic system model
can also account for privileged access. A unitary semantic system hypothesis makes the
assumption that the word “spoon” activates the full semantic representation of this
concept in the same way that seeing a picture of a “spoon” does. However, Caramazza et
al. (1990) state that it is also possible that the perceptual features of the presentation of
the “spoon” will activate other semantic representations, such as those concerning the
metallic colour or the representation of a handle. Thus, it is possible through the
presentation of objects, that specific perceptual features will be given this “privileged
access” without making the assumption of multiple separate semantic systems.
In contrast to the single, amodal semantic system model, Damasio (1990)
proposed a multi-modal model in which semantic memory consists of different types of
sensory and sensorimotor information. Any given item activates a pattern of activation
across the different sensory and sensorimotor cortices. This results in a highly distributed
semantic system in which various “feature fragments” are stored in the cortex that
corresponds to each particular sensory modality and motor cortex. Thus, the
representation for an apple would consist of distributed activation for the smell in the
olfactory cortex, the visual features in the visual cortex, auditory associations in the
auditory cortex, and motor associations in the motor cortex. There is also research
suggesting that the emotional connections of an item are an important component of the
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semantic representation (Brousseau & Buchanan, 2004). Information from different
sensory modalities is integrated at convergence zones in higher level association cortex.
Recognition of an object can only occur once a sufficient number of “feature fragments”
are activated.
Each of the theories of category specific deficits described in this paper could be
categorized very broadly as a hypothesis based on an amodal semantic system or a multi
modal system. The categorical hypothesis (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998) and the
interconnections hypothesis (Gonnerman et al., 1997) are examples of the former while
the sensory/functional hypothesis (Warrington and Shallice, 1984) and the HIT model
(Humphreys and Forde, 2001) are examples of the latter. Like these multi-modal
perspectives, the model of categorical deficits described in this dissertation emphasizes
visual processing and de-emphasizes a “core” semantic processor.
Sensory/Functional Hypothesis
The sensory/functional account of category-specific deficits assumes that
knowledge in semantic memory is organized such that damage to a specific area of the
brain will result in categorical dissociations even though memory may not be organized
by semantic category. The sensory/functional hypothesis proposed by Warrington and
Shallice (1984) was based on findings from a series of eight controlled experiments
conducted on four patients who had partially recovered from HSE1.

because of verbal limitations two of the four patients were only able to participate in one
of the eight experiments.
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As a measure of overall visual and verbal agnosia, in the first experiment the two
patients were required to name and describe 40 clear line drawings of mostly inanimate
objects. Following a short interval they were then required to provide definitions to the
object names presented auditorily. The researchers identified a moderately severe visual
and verbal agnosia in both patients. In subsequent experiments both patients presented
with a significant discrepancy in their ability to identify living versus non-living artefacts.
Although they were usually able to name the superordinate category for both categories
their ability to name and define living things was severely impaired compared to a
significantly more preserved ability to identify non-living artefacts. Both patients also
showed significant impairment in their ability to identify food items and one of the
patients showed a preserved ability to define abstract words, but a moderately severe
deficit in defining concrete words. The two patients presenting with more severe verbal
impairments were administered a spoken word/picture matching task, requiring them to
identify animals, foods, and inanimate objects. These two patients also demonstrated
poorer performance on the animal and food categories than on the inanimate objects
category.
The above results clearly show categorical deficits for both living things and
foods, in comparison to a well-preserved ability to identify non-living artefacts in all four
patients. The performance differences between categories was present across tasks
(verbal description, naming, mimed responses, and picture/word matching) and thus
across input modalities.
In developing a convincing argument for the sensory/functional hypothesis
alternative explanations first had to be discounted. Although all four patients had a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9
relatively severe amnesic syndrome, the authors rejected the hypothesis that this was
entirely responsible for the deficits observed in these patients. If this hypothesis were
accurate, it would be necessary for all reported cases of category specific deficits to occur
in conjunction with a severe amnesic syndrome, which is not the case (Warrington,
1975). The category specificity of the deficits also makes an explanation involving a
visual processing deficit untenable (although this claim will be challenged in the present
paper). More importantly, the fact that the deficit persists across testing in different
sensory modalities implicates a semantic deficit. Likewise, because the deficit persisted
on the word/picture matching tasks any argument that the results occurred because of an
impoverished expressive vocabulary is discredited. In sum, it appears as though the
dichotomy observed in these four patients was the result of a semantic processing deficit.
As further support for the hypothesis that these patients are presenting with a
specific pattern of impairment and preservation of different semantic categories,
Warrington and McCarthy (1987) documented a patient with a reversed pattern of
category-specific deficit. While the four patients studied by Warrington and Shallice
(1984) presented with an impairment in their knowledge of living things and foods and a
preservation of knowledge of non-living artefacts, Warrington and McCarthy (1987)
investigated a patient with semantic deficits for non-living artefacts with preserved
knowledge of foods and living things.
To explain the categorical dissociation observed in their initial four patients
Warrington and Shallice (1984) proposed that knowledge of non-living artefacts is
different from that of living things and foods. More specifically, when distinguishing
between different living things and foods one must rely on knowledge of sensory features
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such as size, colour, shape, and texture. For instance, to distinguish between a leopard
and a tiger, precise visual information (e.g., stripes versus spots) must be accessed. In
contrast, non-living artefacts are more typically defined by their function. Thus, the
distinction between a screw and a nail is related primarily to how they are used (i.e. a nail
is inserted using a hammer and a screw is inserted using a screwdriver). The sensory
features of a screw can vary considerably, but the functional definition remains constant.
Food and living things, on the other hand, have very few identifiable, unique functional
features. Although the identification of non-living artefacts will require the accessing of
some sensory features and the identification of some foods and living things will consist
of some functional features, the weighting of these feature types within each category
differs. Therefore, any damage that occurs to the system underlying the identification of
sensory features will differentially affect foods and living things, whereas damage that
occurs to the system sub-serving functional features will have a greater impact on the
processing of non-living artefacts.
Warrington and McCarthy (1987) also found a distinction within the category of
non-living artefacts, with their patient showing a deficit for small manipulable objects
and preserved knowledge for large man-made objects. Gem stones and musical
instruments tended to be impaired to the same extent as living things, whereas body parts
patterned with non-living artefacts (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Warrington &
Shallice, 1984). To account for this, Warrington and colleagues suggested that gem
stones differ from other non-living artefacts in that they are differentiated primarily by
visual features in much the same way that living things are. Likewise, body parts are
differentiated based on their functional attributes as are most non-living artefacts.
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However, some researchers argue that the sensory/functional hypothesis is not
adequate to account for more fine-grained distinctions (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998)
reported in the literature including a dissociation between the processing of plants and
animals (Farah & Wallace, 1992; Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati, & Humphreys,
1997).
Pre-empting this argument, Warrington and McCarthy (1987) proposed an
extension to the sensory/functional theory that still maintained the hypothesis that
semantic information is organized by modality-specific information. They suggested that
in addition to a differential weighting between the number of sensory features (visual,
auditory, and sensorimotor features) in a category, there can also be a more fine-grained
differentiation within modalities of knowledge. For instance, within the visual modality,
knowledge of any object may consist of colour, shape, location, and motion. In the same
way that different types o f objects will have different weightings of features between
modalities, different objects may have different weightings of colour, shape, location, and
motion features. Thus, the process of differentiating between an apple and an orange may
be more dependent on colour than the process of differentiating between species of
animal, even though both distinctions are heavily reliant on visual features.
Each of these different types of visual features has been shown to be separable
physiologically, anatomically, and psychologically (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987).
Therefore, damage to one of these systems with the sparing of the others may lead to
more fine-grained categorical deficits. It follows from this argument that these types of
categorical deficit would be less likely to occur because of the anatomical proximity of
the systems responsible for processing different features within a single modality. Hence,
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although these fine-grained deficits are possible they are less likely to occur than deficits
to those categories o f knowledge that differ in the weightings of features between
modalities, such as the dissociation that occurs between living and non-living things.
Warrington and McCarthy (1987) proposed a further parsing of the semantic
system based on the finding that deficits are consistent within modalities, but not across
modalities. Because there were differences in consistency between modalities, they
concluded that semantic knowledge is not only separated into sensory and functional
stores, but also into independent stores based on the input modality. Therefore, there may
be a sensory semantic store for visual objects and a sensory store for verbal input.
Because there are separate sensory stores for both visual and auditory inputs there may be
duplication of information within the semantic system. For instance, the fact that tigers
have stripes may be represented in the visual input store as well as the auditory input
store. This more fine-grained specialization of knowledge within the semantic system
would lead to a quasi-categorically organized knowledge base for each modality of input.
In fact, as Caramazza and Shelton (1998) point out, the more fine-grained the
sensory/functional hypothesis becomes, the closer it is to being functionally identical to a
purely categorical separation of living and non-living things within the semantic system.
As more minute sensory details are hypothesized to compose one category and not the
other the more the system is functionally separated into semantic categories.
Based on the arguments discussed above the validity of the sensory/functional
hypothesis is dependent on the suggestion that sensory and functional features are
differentially represented in living things versus non-living artefacts. Although
Warrington and Shallice (1984) made the assumption that this was the case, they
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provided no formal test of the hypothesis. Farah and McClelland (1991) devised a test to
quantify the number of functional and visual features associated with a list of living and
nonliving artefacts. Forty-two undergraduate students were required to read the dictionary
definitions of living and nonliving artefacts and underline all of the occurrences of
functional and visual features. The results showed an average of 2.68 visual features for
all living things and 1.57 for the nonliving artefacts. For functional features, there was an
average of .35 for the living things and 1.11 for the nonliving artefacts. The ratios of
visual to functional features are 7.7:1 for living things and 1.4:1 for nonliving artefacts.
Thus, the data confirmed the hypothesis that visual features are more prevalent in the
definitions for living things than nonliving artefacts.
To further test the predictions of the sensory/functional hypothesis, Farah and
McClelland (1991) developed a parallel distributed processing model in which semantic
knowledge was divided into visual and functional features. In accord with the
sensory/functional hypothesis the assumption was made that semantic knowledge is
composed of information from these two separate but interconnected stores and that the
ratio of visual to functional features is much larger for living than for nonliving artefacts.
When the visual component of the semantic store was “lesioned”, the result proved to be
a deficit for living things with the reverse dissociation occurring following lesions to the
functional component of the semantic store. The results of this study indicate that
category specific deficits can arise from a semantic system that is not categorically
organized, but is instead organized by visual and functional features.
However, as Caramazza and Shelton (1998) point out, the results of the modeling
experiment performed by Farah and McClelland (1991) are not surprising considering the
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ratio of visual to functional features was set at 16.1:2.1 for living things and 9.4:6.7 for
nonliving artefacts. Given these ratios, it is not difficult to predict that damage to the
visual semantic network would result in a more severe deficit for living than for
nonliving things. Thus, the finding of major importance in the study conducted by Farah
and McClelland (1991) is the discrepancy in the ratios of visual and functional features
between living and nonliving artefacts.
Even this finding has been refuted, however (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Tyler,
Moss, Durrant-Peatfield, & Levy, 2000). Caramazza and Shelton (1998) argued that
Farah and McClelland encouraged their participants to exclude functional properties of
living things by the instructions that were given. The participants examining definitions
of words for functional features were instructed to consider only what the item “is for”,
which is principally a property o f artefacts. Potentially, the participants could have found
many more nonsensory features of living things such as, ferocious, carnivore, omnivore,
etc., had the instructions been altered. Thus, the differences in the ratios of sensory to
nonsensory information for living and nonliving things could have been much smaller.
To test this, Caramazza and Shelton (1998) instructed two groups of participants
to underline either all sensory features or all nonsensory features in the definitions of the
living and nonliving artefacts used by Farah and McClelland. They found that the ratios
of sensory to nonsensory features for living things and nonliving artefacts to be 2.9:2.5
and 2.2:2.3, respectively. These results are difficult for the sensory/functional hypothesis
to accommodate and call into question the hypothesis that living things are defined by
more sensory than nonsensory features.
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Humphreys and Riddoch (1999) found results that they interpreted as supporting
the hypothesis that non-living artefacts are better represented by functional definitions
than sensory definitions. They examined the ability of a learning disabled child to learn
lists o f non-living artefacts under two different presentation conditions. In one condition
the child was presented with the target object and another relational object. These were
accompanied by a statement that related the objects spatially. For example, she was
shown a picture of a glass and a table and was told, “this is a glass and you find it on a
table.” This condition was believed to encourage the child to process sensorial features.
In the other condition the child was shown a picture of the object, which was
accompanied by the experimenter miming the action that is typically associated with
using the object. If the object was a glass, for example, the experimenter would mime
taking a drink from the glass. Following each trial the child was required to repeat the
name o f the object before moving on to the next trial. Subsequently, she was presented
with all of the pictures from the lists and asked to give the name of the object and her
performance was better for words learned in the actions condition than in the spatial
condition. Humphries and Riddoch viewed these results as support for the
sensory/functional hypothesis.
Variable and vague usage of the term “functional” has been another criticism of
the sensory/functional hypothesis. Functional knowledge of an object has been
interpreted as how one would act on an object as well as how the object itself operates.
An example of the former interpretation is how one swings a hammer to hit a nail; an
example of the latter is how a horse pulls a carriage. It has also been interpreted as purely
motor knowledge for manipulating an object. Importantly, if not defined as motor
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knowledge, “functional” knowledge must be based in sensory or verbal knowledge or
some combination of the three (sensory, verbal, and motor), since these are the only
forms of knowledge possible. The concept of “sensory knowledge” has also been used
somewhat ambiguously in the literature with some researchers referring specifically to
visual knowledge and others meaning all forms of sensory knowledge.
Processing of Perceptual and Functional Features in Patients with Categorical Deficits
The literature investigating whether patients with deficits for living things have
deficits for the sensory features of all items offers conflicting results. Although a number
of studies appear to confirm this prediction, others have not. Basso et al. (1988) were
among the first to test for the presence of a sensory modality-specific deficit in a patient
with a deficit for living things. They reported that the patient answered 25 out of 29
questions regarding the functional features of living things correctly. By contrast, the
same patient responded correctly to only 10 out of 20 questions regarding the sensory
features of living items.
Silveri and Gainotti (1988) reported results similar to Basso et al’s (1988) from
their examination of a patient with a deficit for living things. The patient was able to
name 1 out of 11 animals correctly from definitions that were based primarily on visual
descriptions, but was able to name 8 of 14 correctly from definitions that stressed the
functional features of the animals. Similarly, De Renzi & Lucchelli (1994) reported that
their subject could answer questions about the functional attributes of living things, but
was unable to answer questions relating to their sensory features. This dissociation
between functional and sensory attributes, however, was not found for non-living
artefacts.
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Although these results appear to support the predictions of the sensory/functional
hypothesis, Caramazza and Shelton (1998) argue that these studies should be viewed with
caution because of the presence of uncontrolled confounds. Specifically, the above
studies failed to control for the relative difficulty of questions about sensory and
functional features. For instance, in the study by Silveri and Gainotti (1988) the patient
was tested on the functional attributes of domesticated animals and the visual attributes of
wild animals, which may well differ in difficulty level. Also, research has shown that
judgments regarding the visual features of items are more difficult than questions about
the functional features (Stewart, Parkin, & Hunkin, 1992). Stewart et al. reported that the
dissociation between visual and functional features disappeared when the difficulty of
items was controlled for in a patient with a category-specific deficit for living things.
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) state that it has yet to be shown that there is a discrepancy
between the processing o f visual and functional features in a patient with a categoryspecific deficit for living things.
Keeping these potential confounds in mind, Gainotti and Silveri (1996) retested
their patient with a category-specific deficit for living things. They controlled for the
effects of word frequency and stimulus familiarity, examined whether the dissociation
between the patient’s ability to identify visual and functional features was an artefact of
stimulus selection, and tested whether the patient’s deficit was limited to visual features,
or included other sensory features as well. The patient again presented with deficits for
animals, plants and flowers, food, and musical instruments, with a relative preservation of
knowledge for non-living objects and body parts. This effect was observed when the
words were matched for frequency and when they were not. Also, although familiarity of
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the items accounted for a large portion of the variance the difference between the
categories persisted after it was controlled.
The most important experiment of Gainotti and Silveri’s (1996) study for the
present discussion tested for deficits for visual-perceptual information and for functionalencyclopedic information. To control for any stimulus frequency or familiarity effects
two descriptions of each item were presented to the patient. One of the descriptions was
based on visual features and the other was based on functional features. The patient was
required to name the item based on the descriptions given. For example, for the word
“horse” the functional description was “domestic animal that neighs, trots, and gallops”
and the visual description was “domestic animal with a flowing mane and tail.” To select
items for which both the functional and visual descriptions were unambiguous and
relatively easy, 150 sentences were given in random order to 5 independent judges
matched to the patient in age and education. The patient had a greater impairment for
identifying the animals from their visual descriptions than from their functional
descriptions (6% and 43% correct, respectively). By contrast, both the visual and the
functional descriptions of non-living artefacts resulted in identical performance of 58
percent correct. However, these results are somewhat compromised by the finding that
the control subjects also performed slightly better when identifying animals from their
functional descriptions than from their visual descriptions (95% and 82% correct,
respectively).
In contrast to the results reported by Gainotti and Silveri (1996), Laiacona et al.
(1997) described two patients with category-specific deficits for living things that showed
equal impairment on visual and functional features of items. When these two patients
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were tested on a forced-choice task with questions about visual or functional features that
were matched for difficulty, there was no difference between performance on visual and
functional questions for living things (73% and 69% correct, respectively for one patient;
55% and 58% correct, respectively for the other) or nonliving artefacts (96% correct for
both visual and functional features for one patient; 91% and 84% correct for the other).
Similarly, Funnell and De Momay Davies (1997) found that the patient previously
examined by Warrington and Shallice (1984) had an equal amount of impairment for the
visual and the functional features of a list of living things.
Consistent with these findings, Caramazza and Shelton (1998) had their patient
respond “true” or “false” to an attribute statement about an object. The patient had an
impaired ability to make judgments about the attributes of animals and food items
regardless of whether the statement related to visual or functional features. This was
contrasted to her performance on the questions about non-living artefacts, which was
within normal limits for both visual and functional features. The impairment with which
this patient presented did not appear to be specific to visual knowledge as hypothesized
by the sensory/functional hypothesis.
As a further test of the predictions of the sensory/functional hypothesis,
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) had their patient view a set of pictures and determine
whether each one was a real animal or a real artefact. Half of the pictures represented a
real item with the other half being a combination of two different items. For example, one
false animal picture was a bear with a horse’s head and a false artefact was a hammer
with the handle of a screw-driver. The patient had difficulty determining which pictures
represented real animals, with a tendency to respond “yes” (70% hit rate and 50% correct
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rejection). On the other hand, the patient had little difficulty distinguishing real from
unreal artefacts (similar results were reported by Kolinsky et al., 2002). In another task,
the patient was required to select which of two heads went with a headless body, or which
of two parts went with a non-living artefact that was missing something. Again, the
patient was severely impaired at selecting the correct animal head, but had no trouble
identifying the correct part for the artefact.
Two conclusions can be reached from the above results. Firstly, performance on
the real and unreal pictures task rules out the possibility that the patient’s impairment was
simply a name retrieval deficit. Secondly, it is difficult for the sensory/functional
hypothesis to account for the finding that the patient’s visual knowledge for living things
was impaired, but his visual knowledge for non-living artefacts was intact. If patients
with deficits for living things have a specific impairment for the processing of
visual/sensory features of items then one would predict that their knowledge for the
visual features o f both animals and artefacts would be impaired, while their knowledge
for the functional features of both animals and artefacts would be spared. The present
results, however, indicate impaired knowledge for the visual and functional attributes of
animals with spared visual and functional knowledge of non-living artefacts.
Kolinsky et al. (2002) also showed that a patient with a category-specific deficit
for living things had impaired knowledge for the structural attributes of living things but
not non-living artefacts. Their patient displayed poor memory drawing and drawing
completion of living things despite an intact ability to copy the figures. Furthermore, they
observed a significant impairment in the patient’s colour knowledge for living things. For
example, in one of the tasks the patient was required to select the correctly coloured
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object from a set o f four. Although he performed within the average range on pictures of
non-living artefacts his performance on pictures of animals was very poor (71% correct
and 5% correct, respectively). This was the case even on items that he recognized (e.g. he
selected the red mouse, yet he correctly named and described it).
The sensory/functional hypothesis has difficulty accounting for the results of
studies presenting patients with deficits for both the sensory and functional features of
living things with a sparing of knowledge for the sensory and functional features of non
living artefacts. However, Humpreys and Forde (2001) pointed out that there are flaws in
both the methodology used and the conclusions reached by the researchers reporting
these results.
Firstly, as mentioned previously the term “functional features” is not well defined
with variability in its use arising not only between studies, but also within them. The most
problematic methodological error is a difference in the definition used for functional
features for living and non-living artefacts. Functional knowledge for nonliving things
has generally referred to how the item is used, which is in many cases dependent on the
motor activity involved in its usage. Functional knowledge for living things, on the other
hand, has included the behaviour of the organism, the environment in which certain
plants and animals are found, and even the sounds that animals make.
In addition to the methodological problems associated with the definition of
functional features the conclusions reached by those who have found deficits for both
sensory and functional features of living things are flawed. Humphreys and Forde (2001)
argue that hypotheses that stress the differential damage of types of knowledge (such as
the sensory/functional hypothesis) can account for category-specific deficits that include
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all types of information (i.e. deficits for both sensory and functional knowledge for living
things). If patients represent living things primarily in terms of visual/sensory
information, then damage to this visual/sensory store may render the knowledge for any
particular living thing inaccessible. Thus, the patients may not be able to access enough
information to distinguish one member of a living category from another. For instance, if
a patient does not know that a camel has two humps, or is brown, or has four legs, then
that patient does not really know what a camel is and will not be able to answer typical
“functional” questions such as “Does a camel live in the desert.” It is possible that in
order to answer any questions about living things, one must first access a visual
representation of that living thing.
The hypothesis that accessing any information about living things is highly
dependent on first accessing a visual representation of that item has been supported by a
number of neuro-imaging studies which showed that areas of the brain responsible for
processing form were activated when participants answered questions about visual
features and functional features of living things (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999;
Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D’Esposito, & Farah, 1999). Thus, one’s ability to “know”
what a living thing is and answer questions both about what it looks like and how it
functions appears to be dependent on one’s ability to access the visual features of the
item. This is contrasted with the finding that the same area of the brain responsible for the
processing of form features is not activated when participants are retrieving functional
information about non-living items. These neuro-imaging data are consistent with an
explanation for category-specific deficits for both sensory and functional knowledge of
living things that is in keeping with the sensory/functional hypothesis.
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In summary, a great deal of research activity has been devoted to falsifying the
sensory/functional model. The model has been defended from these attacks by claims of
methodological problems associated with the definition of functional knowledge in living
things and non-living artefacts. However, the sensory/functional hypothesis has more

difficulty accounting for patients with deficits for living things who have difficulty
performing object decision tasks with living things, but not with non-living artefacts. If
there is damage to visual information processing systems such damage should also impair
the visual processing of non-living artefacts. This inconsistency is addressed in the HIT
model, the visual crowding hypothesis, and in the model being proposed in this paper,
each of which will be discussed later in the introduction.
Categorical Hypothesis
The categorical hypotheses states that living things and non-living artefacts are
represented in separate stores within semantic memory. For instance, Caramazza and
Shelton (1998) proposed that separate stores for living and non-living things have
developed as a result of evolutionary pressures. Initially, evolutionary pressures would
have encouraged the development of neurological structures devoted to living things.
More specifically, neurological structures would have developed to represent animals
because they are important for food and as potential predators. Separate structures would
have developed to represent plant-life also as a source of food and for medicinal
purposes. Non-living artefacts would not be of such importance until later in human
evolution when tool usage developed. The evolutionary gains that accompanied an ability
to distinguish between living and non-living things led to the development of distinct
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neurological structures which now form the organizational basis for conceptual
knowledge.
Proponents of the categorical hypothesis argue that the idea that conceptual
knowledge is organized into these three basic categories can account for some of the
research findings that cannot be easily accommodated within a sensory/functional
framework. For instance, a number of studies described above have reported that patients
with category-specific deficits have an equal impairment for their knowledge of the
functional and sensorial attributes of living things. This is accompanied by an intact
knowledge for both the sensorial and the functional attributes of nonliving things
(Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Funnell & De Momay Davies, 1997; Laiacona et al.
1997). Of course, the sensory/functional hypothesis makes the prediction that if a patient
has a deficit for living things they should have a deficit for the sensorial attributes of both
living and nonliving items but intact functional knowledge for both. The categorical
hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that categorical deficits should be associated with
deficient knowledge for both sensorial and functional features of the affected category,
with intact sensory and functional knowledge for the unaffected category.
The categorical hypothesis can also account for the reports involving some of the
finer-grained dissociations that have been found in patients with category-specific
impairments. For instance, although a number of patients have been found to have
deficits for both plants and animals, some studies have reported on patients presenting
with deficits for one but not the other (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Farah & Wallace,
1992; Forde et al. 1997). If knowledge of plants and animals was maintained by
functionally separate systems, results such as these would be expected to occur.
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The sensory/functional hypothesis explains such deficits as occurring because of
different types o f sensory knowledge being more important for certain items (Warrington
& McCarthy, 1987). For example, intact colour knowledge may be of greater importance
for distinguishing between different types of plants and fruits, whereas shape may be of
greater importance for differentiating between different animals. Therefore, loss of either
colour or shape knowledge will differentially affect these two categories.
One problem with this explanation, however, is that differential weightings of
colour and shape features between categories is currently only assumed and has yet to be
empirically validated or quantified. A second problem with this explanation is similar to
the problem with the broader differentiation of sensory and functional features. Categoryspecific deficits for plants or animals have not been shown to be consistently associated
with deficient colour knowledge. For instance, as described earlier Kolinsky et al. (2002)
presented a patient with a category-specific deficit for living things. This patient was
unable to select correctly coloured animals, but performed within the average range when
required to select the correctly coloured non-living artefact. If this patient’s deficit for
animals was related to deficient colour knowledge, he would not have been able to select
the correctly coloured non-living artefacts.
Although many proponents of the categorical hypothesis state that this theory
offers a better explanation of the more fine-grained dissociations that occur, there are
some patterns that do not fit with the predictions of the theory. The categorical hypothesis
provides no explanation for the patterns of deficits reported by Warrington and McCarthy
(1987) which led to the development of the sensory/functional hypothesis. Although this
patient had deficits for nonliving things, a more fine-grained examination of the deficits
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revealed difficulties with small manipulable objects and body parts, but preserved
knowledge for large man-made objects, gem stones, and musical instruments. This
pattern of impairments is difficult to explain in terms of the categorical hypothesis, but is
actually predicted by the sensory/functional hypothesis.
Much of the research supporting the argument that living and nonliving things are
represented in functionally distinct areas of the brain comes from developmental studies
and research involving semantic knowledge in children. S. Gelman (1988), for example,
reported that four-year-olds could state whether something was made by people, thus
indicating that they had the ability to identify man-made artefacts.
Other studies have shown that preschoolers have an understanding of the basic
differences between living and non-living things. R. Gelman (1990) asked a group of
preschool children to describe what was on the inside and outside of both living and non
living things. The children described the inside of living things in different ways than
they described the outside. The inside of non-living things, on the other hand, was
described in the same way as the outside. Gelman argued that children had learned at an
early age about the biological structure of a particular living thing and had generalized to
other living things without crossing the boundary between living and non-living things.
From this Gelman argued that knowledge of living and non-living things was domainspecific and based on a contrasting set of principles.
Massey and R. Gelman (1988) conducted a similar study on the three- and fouryear-olds’ knowledge o f living and non-living things. The children were presented with
novel pictures of mammals, non-mammalian animals, rigid complex artefacts, wheeled
objects, and statues composed of animal-like parts, and asked to determine which of the
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items was capable of going up a hill unassisted. The children selected both the mammals
and non-mammals, rejecting all other categories including the statues with animal-like
parts. This indicates that the children had the ability to identify those visual-perceptual
characteristics that were reflective of things capable of self-initiated movement. R.
Gelman (1990) later concluded that this ability to distinguish between items that can and
cannot move on their own was the basis of the conceptual distinction between animate
and inanimate objects.
Other researchers have investigated this ability to differentiate animate from
inanimate objects at an even younger age. Mandler, Bauer, and McDonough (1991)
examined the ability of 18-month-old infants to make even more fine-grained
distinctions, separating animals, plants, and non-living items. The infants were able to
make these distinctions as well as distinctions within the categories, such as separating
furniture from kitchen utensils. These results led the authors to hypothesize that the
infants were grouping items not based on visual similarities, but were relying instead on
the movement patterns and the origin of the movement associated with each category.
This hypothesis has implications for the dissociations that occur in category-specific
deficits, possibly illustrating a mechanism by which evolution could select for the
functional separation of the representations of living and non-living things. Furthermore,
elements of the sensory/functional hypothesis are also incorporated. If infants are selected
to distinguish and group objects based on the sensory feature of movement patterns, then
this would provide a mechanism by which the representations of animate and inanimate
objects are functionally separated within the semantic system.
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Caramzza and Shelton (1998) elaborated on their proposal that semantic
information is organized categorically in The Organized Unitary Content Hypothesis
(OUCH). In OUCH the idea of modality specific semantic organization and the notion
that category-specific deficits arise from differential weightings of sensorial and nonsensorial features between categories is rejected. In OUCH, although there are no
categorical boundaries within the semantic system, a categorical structure emerges
because of clustering of like features within a category.
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) elaborate on two fundamental characteristics of
categories on which the OUCH is based. First of all, the properties of an object are highly
intercorrelated. Second, members of a superordinate category share a number of features
in common. Thus, a certain group of animals is going to consist of particular shapes,
textures, colours, and scents, whereas a non-living artefact is going to have different
types of features. In other words, certain properties tend to occur with one another or are
intercorrelated. In addition, these intercorrelated features are going to be differentially
distributed in the categories of living and nonliving things. Therefore, the
multidimensional space o f semantic features is not organized homogeneously, but instead
consists of some regions that are densely packed and others that are more diffuse
(lumpy). The dense regions consist of features that are highly correlated and are likely to
represent concepts relating to living things. This is because living items tend to have
more highly correlated features than do nonliving things.
From this hypothesized inhomogeneous organization of the semantic system it
follows that focal damage is likely to result in category-specific deficits. Furthermore,
those semantic categories that contain highly correlated features (living things) are
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densely packed and more likely to be damaged than those categories with less correlated
features. The other prediction arising from this theory is that various patterns of categoryspecific deficits can occur as a result of the differences in the patterns of brain damage
from case to case. Because the semantic system is hypothesized to be unitary but lumpy,
the exact pattern of deficits will depend on the exact areas of the brain that have been
damaged. Therefore, although it is more likely that a patient will present with a categoryspecific deficit for living things because the features of this category are densely packed,
in the OUCH the possibility that a patient may present with a deficit for large non-living
objects and gem-stones in addition to living things is allowed.
Another major prediction made by OUCH is that category-specific deficits should
not be associated with a disproportionate deficit for visual over functional attributes.
This is because focal damage to the semantic system should affect highly correlated
features regardless of whether those features are visual or functional. This prediction
clearly distinguishes the OUCH hypothesis from the sensory/functional hypothesis which
predicts a discrepancy in the knowledge for sensory versus functional features.
The discrepancy between the processing of perceptual and functional features in
living and non-living things was discussed in the previous section. There is evidence that
patients with deficits for living things have greater difficulty processing the visual
attributes of this category compared to their ability to process the visual attributes of non
living artefacts (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Kolinsky et al., 2002).
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Alzheimer’s Disease and the Intercorrelations Hypothesis
Alzheimer’s Disease and Category-Specific Deficits
Recently, many of the hypotheses about the representation and storage of
categorical knowledge has also been examined in patients with Alzheimer’s Disease
(AD) that present with category-specific deficits. The fact that a number of researchers
previously believed that category-specific deficits were the result of localized lesions and
AD resulted in damage that was more diffuse led to the AD population being largely
ignored until recently (Gonnerman et al. 1997).
However, Silveri et al. (1991) hypothesized that because AD patients present
initially with damage to temporolimbic structures they would be likely to experience such
impairments, much like HSE patients. As predicted, AD patients demonstrated a pattern
of impairment similar to that of HSE patients, showing greater impairments for living
things than for non-living things. Based on these results and those from earlier studies of
stroke patients the authors hypothesized that damage to temporolimbic structures results
in a selective semantic impairment for living things, and damage to frontoparietal areas
results in a category-specific impairment for non-living artefacts.
A later paper by Guistolisi, Bartolomeo, Daniele, Marra, and Gainotti (1993)
reported similar results to those of Silveri et al. (1991) for patients in the early stages of
the disease. When the patients were tested six months later, two of three no longer
showed an effect of category. As one would expect, this was not the result of an
improvement in their performance with living things, but a deterioration in their
performance with non-living artefacts. The authors concluded that as the disease
progresses the damage becomes so pervasive that deficits become apparent in all forms of
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knowledge. This illustrates one of the difficulties with studies involving AD patients: the
pattern of deficits is extremely heterogeneous, meaning that much larger sample sizes are
necessary than those used in the above studies in order to make any conclusions about the
group as a whole.
The finding that AD patients present with category-specific deficits suggested to
some researchers the possibility that they can emerge as a result of non-selective damage
to a unitary semantic system. This depends, however, on the assumption that concepts are
represented as different patterns of activation over multiple semantic features. It is the
patterns of connections that differentiate one category from another with some categories
being represented by more or fewer connections than others. Random damage to
connections will then result in a pattern of deficits that appears to be category-specific.
The Intercorrelations Hypotheses
The idea that category-specific deficits can arise from diffuse damage to a
connectionist system has received some empirical support from studies of patients with
AD and from patients with other forms of pathology. Moss and Tyler (1997,2000)
examined a patient with generalized cerebral atrophy who presented with a
disproportionate deficit for non-living artefacts that became more pronounced as her
condition worsened. Likewise, Tyler et al. (2000) reported the same pattern of deficits in
a patient with generalized cerebral atrophy, thus indicating that focal lesions are not
necessary for the development of category-specific semantic impairments.
Gonnerman et al. (1997) tested a group of 15 patients with probable AD in the
mild to moderate stages. In contrast to the results reported by Silveri et al. (1991), as a
group the patients did not show greater impairment in their knowledge for living things
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than for non-living things. Based on the discrepant findings of the two studies and the
argument that the neuropathology present in AD is actually less localized than Silveri et
al. suggested, Gonnerman et al. rejected the hypothesis that patients with AD present with
category-specific deficits for living things because of damage to temporolimbic
structures.
However, closer inspection of the data of individual subjects revealed that one of
the patients had a category-specific deficit for living things and another had a selective
deficit for non-living things. Furthermore, in contrast to the findings reported by Silveri et
al., data from these two patients revealed that these category-specific deficits remained
fairly stable over the course of two to four years. Although the authors acknowledged that
the results could be explained simply by assuming that the patient with deficits for living
things had damage to temporolimbic structures and the patient with deficits for non-living
things had frontoparietal damage, they stated that neither MRI scans nor
neuropsychological testing supported this hypothesis.
In a second experiment involving 15 patients with mild to moderate AD
Gonnerman et al. (1997) found that those patients who were less impaired tended to show
slight deficits for non-living artefacts, whereas those who were more severely impaired
tended to have a greater deficit for living things. Although this trend was not statistically
verified it motivated the development of a theory to explain the pattern of deficits in AD
patients. In this theory, living things are less affected by small amounts of generalized
brain atrophy than non-living things because living things tend to have a greater number
of intercorrelated features than non-living things. Intercorrelated features are those
features that occur together for multiple items within a semantic category. For instance,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

“has fur” and “has teeth” are features that occur together for a number o f different
animals and are therefore considered intercorrelated features. Moreover, according to this
view, those features that distinguish one item in a category from another item are
different for living and non-living things. Similar to the sensory/functional hypothesis
(Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) and the visual crowding hypothesis (Humpreys and
Riddoch, 1987; described in the following section) Gonnerman et al. suggest that
distinguishing features tend to be sensorial for living things and functional for non-living
things.
Thus, the main tenets of the theory are that living things tend to have a higher
ratio of sensory to functional features than non-living things; living things have a greater
number of intercorrelations between features than non-living things; and those features
that distinguish one living thing from another tend to be sensorial, while functional
features distinguish non-living things from one another. The effect of the numerous
intercorrelations among living things will be protective when the damage is minimal
because the information from individual features is supported by the intercorrelations
with other features. However, as the disease progresses and more connections are lost a
critical point will be reached when the remaining connections can no longer compensate
for the loss and activation of the remaining features will no longer reach the threshold of
comprehension. Once this stage is reached all of those items that relied on the
connections among a damaged set of features are left unavailable. Similar to the
categorical hypothesis (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998) this theory allows for a unitary
semantic system.
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A similar theory has been proposed by McRae and Seidenberg (1997). McRae and
Seidenberg had normal participants generate lists of the important features of exemplars
from living items and non-living artefacts. The results indicated that living items tend to
have more intercorrelated features than non-living items. This is protective for living
items when there is a small amount of damage, but results in the loss of entire categories
with larger amounts of damage. As an illustration of this process imagine the features
“has four legs”, “has fur”, “has teeth”, and “has claws”. These features are all
intercorrelated and represent a large number of mammals. If the connections between one
of the features is damaged the remaining connections will be able to compensate, thereby
allowing comprehension of all of the mammals that are represented by these features.
However, once a critical point is reached all of those mammals that are represented by the
features will no longer be available in semantic memory. The result of this process is a
non-linear deterioration in the representations of living things as AD progresses.
This pattern of deficits is contrasted by those that occur for non-living artefacts.
Because there are fewer intercorrelations between the features of non-living artefacts,
there is a very limited ability of intact connections to compensate for damaged ones. This
results in a slight deficit for artefacts even in the earlier stages of disease progression. As
the disease progresses there will be a loss of knowledge of individual items across
categories of artefacts. However, because there are relatively few intercorrelations among
artefacts whole categories are not lost at advanced stages of the disease. Thus, the
presentation of deficits for artefacts will proceed linearly with disease progression, in
contrast to the pattern o f deficits for living things.
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Although the theory proposed by Gonnerman et al. (1997) seems to hold some
explanatory power for the results of a number of the patients examined in their study, the
results from the AD population as a whole are far from clear. In fact, a number of the
patients studied by Gonnerman et al. (1997) did not fit the predicted pattern, with four
showing greater non-living artefacts deficits than would be predicted. The authors
suggest the possibility that in some cases damage that is more focal in nature may occur
by chance resulting in patterns of deficits that do not fit with predictions.
As mentioned previously the results of Silveri et al. (1991) are at odds with those
of Gonnerman et al. Silveri et al. reported that their subjects with moderate AD showed
an overall deficit for living things, whereas the patients in Gonnerman et al.’s study did
not. Giustolisi et al. (1993) reported results that were similar on initial testing to those
reported by Silveri et al., with the group of AD patients showing an overall deficit for
living things. They also reported that when the patients were examined six months later
the category-specific deficit for living things disappeared. The authors argued that AD
patients present initially with deficits for living things, but at later stages of the disease
process damage becomes so pervasive that the category effect is lost. This pattern of
results conflicts with the predictions of Gonnerman et al. (1997), who state that there
should be an initial deficit for non-living things followed by a deficit for living things as
the disease progresses.
Garrard, Patterson, Watson, and Hodges (1998) reported results that were similar
to those of Silver et al. (1991) and Guistolisi et al. (1993), with their patients showing an
overall deficit for living things. Garrard et al. also questioned whether intercorrelations
between features would provide protection from decay. They disagree with Gonnerman et
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al. (1997) who state that the majority of patients with degenerative diseases present with
neural pathology that is more diffuse than focal. Garrard et al. state that in the majority of
cases patients will present with category-specific deficits for living things that are
associated with an initial involvement of the transentorhinal cortex and the temporal
neocortex. A minority of patients will show deficits for non-living things that is related to
damage of bi-parietal regions. The authors incorporate the hypotheses developed in the
sensory/functional hypothesis, stating that the double dissociation that occurs between the
two groups of patients reflects the storage of perceptual features in the temporal lobes and
the storage of functional features in the fronto-parietal regions.
Whatmough et al. (2003) also found an overall deficit for biological things in a
group of 72 AD patients. To examine the relationship between the severity of the
semantic deficit and the strength of the category effect the authors grouped the patients
based on their scores on a picture naming task (the Categorical Picture Naming Task
(CPNT) developed by Chertkow, Murtha, Frederickson, and Whitehead, 1999). Those
patients that performed at the highest level on the CPNT did not show any categoryspecific deficit for living things. As the level of semantic impairment increased, however,
so did the degree of separation between performance with living things and non-living
artefacts, up to a category difference of 20% for those patients who were most severely
impaired. In fact, 68 of the 72 AD patients presented with the categorical deficit for living
things and only two presented with the opposite pattern of deficits. These results are not
consistent with the intercorrelational model proposed by Gonnerman et al. (1997).
The potential for random damage in a unitary semantic system to create categoryspecific deficits has also been examined by lesioning distributed connectionist models.
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Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, and Seidenberg (1998) were concerned with how such a
model could account for category-specific deficits that occurred as a result of the random,
patchy damage that is found in patients with AD. Similar to the model developed *by
Farah and McClelland (1991) concepts were represented as vectors distributed over
perceptual and functional semantic features and living things were represented with a
higher proportion of perceptual features than non-living things. These implementations
also accounted for those characteristics described by Gonnerman et al. (1997) such as the
differential representation of distinctive features between the categories, with living
things having more shared features and fewer distinctive features than non-living things.
The living things category was also given more strongly correlated features than non
living things as was demonstrated by McRae, de Sa, and Seidenberg (1997).
Similar to the pattern of results reported by Gonnerman et al. (1997) mild
nonselective damage to the model caused a category-specific deficit for non-living things
because there were fewer correlated features to compensate for the loss than there was for
living things. With more severe lesions, however, whole categories of living things were
lost resulting in a greater deficit for living things. This model predicts that with mild
nonselective damage there will be a deficit for non-living things that will progress to a
deficit for living things as damage becomes more extensive. However, the study by
Gonnerman et al. (1997) is the only one to report anything that resembles this pattern of
deficits in a patient population.
In a more recent investigation of the deficits associated with AD, Zannino, Perri,
Carlesimo, Pasqualetti, and Caltagirone (2001) attempted to determine whether a true
category-specific deficit exists for this population and whether the pattern of deficit was
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related to the overall severity of the impairment. This study improved upon previous ones
by controlling confounding variables such as frequency, prototypicality, visual
complexity, age of acquisition, and name and image agreement. The results showed an
overall category-specific deficit for living things similar to those reported in previous
studies (Garrard et al., 1998; Guistolisi et al., 1993; & Sliveri et al., 1991) and contrasted
with the results reported by Gonnerman et al. (1997). Furthermore, although Gonnerman
et al. hypothesized that AD patients may present with deficits for non-living things early
in the disease process, Zannino et al. (2001) failed to find a single subject out of a total of
fifty-three that presented with this pattern of deficits.
The relationship between disease progression and severity of category-specific
deficit was also examined. The results reported differed from all other reports of this
relationship. Gonnerman et al. (1997) reportedly found deficits for non-living artefacts
early in the disease process followed by a switch to a more severe deficit for living things
later in the progression of AD. In contrast, Guistolisi et al. (1993) reported an initial
category-specific deficit for living things that later disappeared as performance with non
living artefacts also deteriorated. Zannino et al. (2001) reported that the initial categoryspecific deficit for living things was mild and actually became more pronounced in the
latter stages of the disease.
Tyler et al. (2000) proposed a connectionist model similar to that of Gonnerman
et al. (1997) hypothesizing that diffuse damage, as opposed to focal damage, was
responsible for category-specific deficits for living things. This theory also allows for the
possibility of a unitary semantic system that is not separated into different components
for different types of semantic information. Central to this model is the hypothesis that
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functional features of concepts are of particular importance and are more resilient to brain
damage than sensorial features. Furthermore, functional features play a different role in
the representations of living and non-living things. For non-living things the function of
an item is of utmost importance to the conceptual representation and is clearly associated
with the physical form of the item. For instance, the shape of a shovel is strongly
connected to its function and it is this function that differentiates it from other items.
From this, Tyler et al. (2000) suggest that it is functional information that differentiates
one non-living item from another.
Although previous theories have suggested that functional features are relatively
limited for living things, Tyler et al. (2000) disagree. They propose that functional
information (albeit a different type of functional information) is very important to the
representation of living things. This was supported from property generation norms in
which subjects listed the features for non-living artefacts and living things. A feature was
scored as perceptual if it could be processed by the senses and functional if it indicated
how the item interacted with the environment. Using this procedure and the revised
definition for functional features subjects actually reported more functional features for
living things than for non-living artefacts. This functional information, termed biological
function, includes any range o f activities including eating, sleeping, moving, flying,
running, etc. In the same way that certain functional features of non-living things are
associated with certain perceptual features, functional information about living things is
connected to sensorial features. Thus, the function of flying is associated with the
perceptual features of wings, walking with legs, and seeing with eyes.
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It is the connections between functional and perceptual features that are
emphasized in this theory. Those perceptual features shared within categories of living
things are strongly connected to shared functions. That is, those perceptual features that
are common to most members of a category are associated with the function that most
members of the category also possess. This is not necessarily true for distinctive
perceptual features, which are less likely to be associated with a function. In contrast,
non-living artefacts are composed of distinctive perceptual features that are associated
with equally distinctive functional features. Those perceptual features that a group of
non-living artefacts share are not likely to be associated with a function.
If one assumes that strongly connected features are more resilient to damage than
are weakly connected features, these differences in the connections that exist between the
features of living and non-living things have implications for the patterns of deficits
expected following damage. Because distinctive perceptual features of non-living things
are connected to functional features and shared perceptual features of living things are
connected to functional features it is these features that will be most resistant to damage.
Following non-focal lesions, distinctive features of non-living things will remain, but
only those features that are shared among groups of living things will be preserved.
Tyler et al. (2000) created a connectionist model that incorporated the features
discussed above to test the following predictions: 1) strongly correlated features will be
robust against lesioning because of mutual activation compensating for degraded features,
2) functional information for both living and non-living things will tend to be preserved
because it is always associated with perceptual information; 3) functional information for
living things should be more robust than for non-living artefacts because the functional
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features of living things are themselves highly intercorrelated, and 4) the preservation of
perceptual features will depend on whether they are intercorrelated with each other and/or
functional features. For the reasons discussed above, this should result in preserved
distinctive information for non-living artefacts with degraded shared perceptual
information and degraded distinctive perceptual information with intact shared perceptual
information for living things.
The modeling data from this study supported the predictions. Random lesioning
of both perceptual and functional feature connections produced an initial impairment for
living things followed by impairment for non-living artefacts with more severe damage.
At moderate levels of damage the model predicts difficulty discriminating between living
things within a category, but preserved knowledge of shared information. For artefacts,
on the other hand, there should be no difficulties distinguishing among items, but
knowledge of category membership will be impaired.
Currently, there is little patient data to support the predictions of this model since
the discrepancies in performance on tests of distinctive and shared features have not been
examined. Since deficits for non-living artefacts and living things are predicted with
different degrees of damage, the authors argue that the model is able to account for the
double dissociation between living and non-living things. However, none of the studies
on AD patients have shown a progression from deficits for living things to deficits for
non-living artefacts at later stages of the disease.
To summarize, given the heterogeneity of the findings, the deficits that have been
shown to occur in patients with AD could not be said to support or refute any of the
current theories regarding category-specific deficits. The only observation that has been
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reported with some consistency is that some AD patients do present with a categoryspecific deficit for living things. Presently, the results of testing for category-specific
deficits in patients with AD has not allowed for any solid conclusions about the
presentation or progression of these deficits, due to the amount of variability in the
results. Although this variability is likely an artefact of the nature of the disease itself
(and its diagnosis), further research is necessary to clarify those experimental variables
that are causing additional variability between different studies. In all studies of category
specific deficits in AD, patient categorization based on disease severity and
neuropsychological profiles may be helpful in determining the relationship between
neuropathology and category specific deficits.
The Hierarchical Interactive Theory (HIT)
The HIT model is perhaps the most comprehensive conceptualization of object
recognition and category-specific deficits for living and non-living artefacts. The model
was developed from the cascade model and the concept of visually crowded categories as
proposed by Humphreys and Riddoch (1987). The theory of visually crowded categories
suggests that because living things such as mammals and fruits have such a high degree
of visual similarity within categories that any impairment in visual processing is going to
affect living things more than non-living things. Visual crowding occurs when the
features extracted from an item are no longer sufficient to differentiate it from another
similar item.
This phenomenon may only occur when the stimulus set being learned exceeds
some critical number (Gale, Done, & Frank, 2001). This is observed in the living world
with certain biological categories (birds, fish, plants, flowers) for which expertise is
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required to distinguish between members of a super-ordinate category. Even when
discriminating within categories for which expertise is not necessarily required
(mammals), the members are much more similar than categories of non-living artefacts.
When brain damage occurs category-specific deficits may emerge for visually crowded
categories as a result of some restriction on the number of features available for each item
(Gale et al., 2001). Although this explanation can account for specific deficits for living
things with preserved visual recognition of non-living artefacts it offers no explanation
for the reverse pattern of deficits.
The theory involving visually crowded categories received support from a study
by Gaffan and Heywood (1993) who trained monkeys to discriminate between pairs of
pictures from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set. Error rates during training were
three times higher when the monkeys were discriminating living things relative to non
living things. A similar pattern of performance was found with human participants as
well. The authors argued that the concept of visually crowded categories offered the best
explanation for their results.
Humphrys, Riddoch, and Quinlan (1988) elaborated on the concept of visually
crowded categories in their “Cascade model” of object recognition and category specific
deficits for living things. In this model object recognition occurs over three distinct
stages; recognition of the object’s structure, access to semantic information related to the
object, and access to the object’s name. Information regarding the object’s structure is
hypothesized to be separate from information regarding the object’s use and its
association to other objects (semantic information), and from the object’s name. Semantic
information refers to all other forms of non-perceptual knowledge. Selective damage can

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44
occur at any of the three stages such that a patient could have deficits for the semantic
information regarding an object, but have intact structural knowledge.
The key to the cascade model is that activation can proceed to another stage
before processing at the previous stage is complete. For “visually crowded” items
activation of similar perceptual features across the category will result in semantic
information regarding the category of an object to be derived quickly. The gains from this
quick access are cancelled by slowed access to knowledge regarding the individual item
due to increased competition within the category. The opposite pattern is assumed for
structurally dissimilar objects, which will be relatively delayed on category decisions, but
individual item identification will occur relatively quickly because of reduced perceptual
competition among category members. Consistent with this prediction Humphreys et al.
(1988) found that normal participants named living items more slowly than non-living
artefacts. Furthermore, category decisions have been shown to be faster for living items
than for non-living items (Humphreys & Forde, 2001).
Humphreys and Forde (2001) expanded on the Cascade model in the Hierarchical
Interactive Theory (HIT) in which object naming requires the transmission of information
through a series o f interactive hierarchical stages. Thus, in addition to the hierarchical,
three-stage process described in the Cascade Model, in the HIT a re-interrogation of
structural knowledge is proposed. Object processing occurs as a “first pass” through the
stored structural descriptions stage and then onto partial activation of an
associative/functional (semantic) knowledge stage. However, individual identification of
living things requires further interrogation of perceptual knowledge to allow the target to
be differentiated from its closest neighbours. For example, processing of an apple would
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proceed from initial visual processing to access the semantic representation of fruit along
with the word “fruit”. This semantic information would then be fed back into the visual
description system to distinguish among members of the category “fruit”. Thus, for living
items this means further processing of form via connections from the semantic system
back to the visual system.
Patients with deficits for living items are hypothesized to have mild deficits in
perceptual knowledge which prevents successful re-entrant activation from semantic
memory. For non-living artefacts, interrogation of action-related information is necessary
and patients with deficits for these items may have subtle deficits in action-related
information.
Humphreys and Forde (2001) distinguish between two types of patients with
category specific deficits for living things. One group of patients has difficulties
performing object decisions for the affected category as described by Caramazza and
Shelton (1998). This group is hypothesized to have deficits affecting their ability to
access information for living things at the structural description level in addition to any
deficits occurring at a latter stage in processing. A second group, however, has been
shown to have intact object decision abilities for the affected category (Laiacona et al.,
1997). Humphreys and Forde suggest that these patients do not have a deficit for the
structural knowledge o f the objects and that their deficit occurs at a later processing stage.
The HIT model is able to accommodate most, if not all, varieties of categoryspecific deficits observed clinically and the experimental findings associated with each.
This includes all of those findings that support the sensory/functional hypothesis because
a similar distinction is made between the importance of sensory and functional features in
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different categories of items. The advantage that the HIT account holds over the
sensory/functional hypothesis is that the findings of Caramazza and Shelton (1998)
involving poor object decision abilities for living things with intact object decision for
non-living things can be explained. In the HIT model difficulties performing object
decision tests specific to living things is predicted because such items are visually
crowded and require re-entrant activation to distinguish among them.
Neuroanatomy of Category Specific Deficits
Each of the models discussed above makes a prediction as to what neuroanatomical structures will be associated with a category-specific deficit. The
sensory/functional hypothesis as proposed by Warrington and Shallice (1984) states that
visual attributes are very important in constructing the semantic representation for living
things suggesting that damage to those structures responsible for storing and processing
visual features should be associated with this deficit. A similar prediction is made in the
HIT account (Humphreys & Forde, 2001). Furthermore, deficits for non-living things
should be associated with damage to those areas responsible for processing “functional”
information.
Contrary to this prediction, those theories that emphasize the importance o f the
intercorrelations among semantic features hypothesize that it is not necessarily the
location of the damage that accounts for these deficits, but the extent and severity of brain
damage that will predict a category-specific deficit for living things (Gonnerman et al.,
1997; Moss, Tyler, Durrant-Peatfield, & Bunn, 1998).
Finally, the predictions of the categorical hypothesis are based on the idea that
separate semantic stores for animals, plants, and artefacts have developed through
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evolution. Because escape and feeding responses are associated with emotional reactivity
it is hypothesized that limbic structures are responsible for representing the semantic
features for plants and animals. Also, damage to the structures associated with these
representations will result in deficits for all types of information related to these
categories as opposed to deficits for just visual or functional features.
Gainotti (2000) performed a meta-analysis of the studies reporting on patients
with category-specific deficits and the neuro-anatomical location of damage. The
majority of the patients presenting with a semantic deficit for living things suffered from
HSE, head trauma, and semantic dementia, which tended to result in bilateral damage to
the anterior portions of the temporal lobes. This was contrasted by those patients that
presented with just a lexical deficiency for living things which was usually caused by a
stroke resulting in damage to the infero-mesial portions of the temporal and occipital
lobes in only the left hemisphere. Although semantic deficits for living things were
usually associated with bilateral damage, left hemisphere involvement was predominant
in the majority of cases.
Closer inspection of the deficit for living things revealed some general differences
in the neuro-anatomical damage associated with deficits for plants and those found with
deficits for animals. Etiologically, diseases that tended to produce more focal damage
also resulted in more focal deficits. Stroke tended to be the cause of category-specific
deficits for plants, while HSE was equally represented in patients with deficits for plants,
plants and animals, and animals. Semantic dementia, on the other hand, only resulted in
deficits for both plants and animals. Also of interest is the finding that bi-temporal
damage was reported in the majority of patients with deficits for both plants and animals,
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in half of the patients with deficits for animals, and in only a quarter of patients that had
deficits for just plants.
Gainotti (2000) further examined twenty studies that reported a more fine-grained
analysis of the structures involved in patients with category-specific deficits. The areas
examined in the studies included the hippocampus (H), the parahippocampal gyrus
(PHG), the temporal pole (TP), the inferior temporal lobe (IT), the antero-lateral temporal
areas (AL), the postero-lateral temporal cortices (PL), and the medial temporo-occipital
areas (TO). The results appeared to confirm that the usual neuro-anatomical correlate of
category-specific semantic impairments for living things is bi-lateral temporal lobe
lesions with a preference for the left temporal lobe. More specifically, damage was found
to occur in the anterior portions of the temporal lobes including TP, H, PHG, IT, and AL,
while the PL portions were spared. All patients showed damage to the inferior temporal
lobe (IT), although the extension and symmetry of the damage was found to vary.
As expected, patients with deficits for non-living things tended to show a different
pattern of neuro-anatomical damage than those patients with deficits for living things.
Semantic deficits for non-living things were associated with damage to the left ffontotemporo-parietal area and were always accompanied by Broca’s, Wernicke’s, or global
aphasia.
Broadly speaking, this neuroanatomical dissociation between deficits for living
versus non-living things appears to reflect the separation between the ventral and dorsal
pathways. This division is based on experiments showing that lesions of the parietal
cortex in monkeys resulted in deficits in localizing an object with respect to a particular
landmark, but not in the identification of the object. In contrast, lesions of the inferior
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temporal cortex resulted in an inability to recognize objects, but did not affect their ability
to process the location of objects (Bullier, 2002). The observation of a similar
dissociation in patient’s with known lesions led to the distinction between the “what”
pathway referring to the ventral stream and the inferior temporal cortex and the “where”
pathway referring to the dorsal stream and the parietal cortex (Bullier, 2002). Currently,
theories regarding the function of the dorsal pathway have been refined, suggesting that it
is involved in visuomotor action networks, not only processing “where” an item is, but
also “how” it might be used (Devlin et al., 2002).
Despite damage to these broad pathways and general areas being associated with
different types o f semantic impairment there is considerable variability in the effects of
damage to specific areas. Based on the demonstrations of variability in the neuroanatomical structures involved, Gainotti (2000) argued that the search for a structure that
is critically involved in the representation of living things may not be fruitful. The results
did, however, implicate some regions that are important for the processing of living
things which he interpreted as supportive of the hypothesis that deficits for living things
result from damage to visual knowledge and deficits for non-living things occur because
of damage to functional knowledge.
Specifically, the network including the infero-temporal cortex, the mesial
temporo-limbic structures, and the temporal pole appear to be involved in the
representations of living things and have been found to be associated with sensory
information. The inferior temporal lobe has been shown to receive projections from area
V4 and is part of the extra-striate visual processing system which is believed to play a
role in object recognition (Goodale, Milner, Jacobson, & Carey, 1991). The entorhinal
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cortex has been shown to receive integrated input from all of the sensory modalities
receiving projections from unimodal association areas as well as polymodal association
areas (Jones & Powell, 1970). Finally, Damasio (1990) has hypothesized that the
temporal pole is a higher order convergence zone acting to bind together different
components of an items representation. Thus, the above structures can be conceived of as
components of a system that is involved in processing, storing, and retrieving sensory
information.
In sum, the results of the meta-analysis performed by Gainotti (2000) have
important implications for the theoretical basis of category-specific deficits. The
sensory/functional hypothesis and the HIT are consistent with the results of this study
which showed that deficits for living things are in fact associated with focal damage to
areas of the brain believed to be involved in the storage and retrieval of sensory
information. The results of cognitive testing were also consistent with this hypothesis
showing that those categories that were more dependent on sensory features tended to
pattern with living things, while categories that relied more on functional features did not.
For instance, food and musical instruments tended to be deficient in those patients with
specific deficits for living things, whereas knowledge for body parts was still intact along
with all artefacts.
The categorical hypothesis,with its separate semantic categories for animals,
plants, and artefacts, has difficulty explaining this pattern of deficits. The neuroanatomical results are also problematic for the intercorrelations hypothesis. This theory
states that the dissociation between living and non-living things is dependent more on the
severity of damage to the semantic system than on the location of focal lesions. Thus,
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because living things have a greater number of intercorrelations among features they
should be spared with limited diffuse damage to the semantic system, but show a
dramatic decline with more severe brain damage. These data did not support this
hypothesis.
Research with Non-Patient Populations
Gerlach and colleagues have performed a series of experiments using neuro
imaging techniques to examine what regions of the brain are activated during different
types of object identification tasks in normals. For instance, Gerlach, Law, Gade, and
Paulson (1999) examined the neural correlates of object recognition and whether these
regions differed for living objects versus non-living artefacts. On an object decision task
the authors reported peak activations in the fusiform gyri, the parahippocampal gyri, the
limbic lobes, the right occipital gyrus, the right superior parietal lobe, the right inferior
frontal gyrus, the left middle occipital gyrus, and the left inferior temporal gyrus for both
living objects and non-living artefacts. Thus, compared to performance on a simple
pattern discrimination task the object decision tasks activated more ventral and posterior
parts of the brain. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the ventral stream is
important for object identification.
The object decision tasks did not activate left dorsolateral prefrontal areas, which
are generally associated with verbal/semantic knowledge suggesting that object decision
tasks can be performed by accessing visual knowledge only. This type of task may be
very useful when examining visual processing in isolation from semantics. As task
difficulty increased larger parts of the right inferior temporal and anterior fusiform gyri
were recruited for living objects compared to non-living artefacts. The authors suggest
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that this may support the idea that greater perceptual differentiation is required for living
objects.
Similar results were reported by Whatmough, Chertkow, Murtha, and Hanratty
(2002) and Moore and Price (1999). Whatmough et al. reported that naming of animals
compared with the naming of tools was associated with increased regional Cerebral
Blood Flow (rCBF) in the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri bilaterally. Moore and
Price found that naming o f living objects compared to naming of non-living artefacts
resulted in increased rCBF in the posterior portion of the right middle temporal gyrus and
the anterior temporal lobes. All of the above findings are consistent with the hypothesis
that living objects are more visually similar.
Based on the above results obtained from tests on normal participants it appears as
though some forms of category-specific deficits for living objects could result from
damage to the visual processing system. This could be viewed as support for the visual
crowding hypothesis (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987) and the sensory/functional
hypothesis (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). However, the differences between living
objects and non-living artefacts must extend beyond this visual processing differentiation
because this alone cannot explain the presence of deficits for non-living artefacts in the
absence of deficits for living objects.
A number of studies have implicated the left ventral premotor cortex (PMv) as
playing a greater role in the processing of non-living artefacts than living objects (Chao
& Martin, 2000; Gerlach et al., 2000). This area is believed to be the human homologue
of the monkey F5 area which has been found to be involved in motor planning tasks such
as grasping, holding, and manipulating objects (Binkofski et al., 1999). Furthermore,
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Gainotti, Silveri, Daniele, and Guistolisi (1995) observed that patients with categoryspecific deficits for non-living artefacts often have lesions in the area of the PMv. Based
on these findings Chao and Martin (2000) have suggested that the comprehension of non
living artefacts may be dependent on motor-based knowledge of object utilization. Devlin
et al. (2002) have since hypothesized that the left PMv along with the left posterior
parietal lobe and the left posterior middle temporal region are an important part of the
dorsal stream forming a visuomotor action network.
Gerlach et al. (2002) attempted to further illuminate the exact role that action
knowledge may play in the comprehension of non-living artefacts. It does not appear as
though deficient action knowledge as a whole can explain non-living artefact
comprehension deficits since it has been shown that patients with apraxia resulting from
left ffonto-parietal lesions do not necessarily present with comprehension deficits. This
has been illustrated in studies documenting patients that have preserved knowledge for
the function of objects that they cannot utilize, or vice versa (Buxbaum, Schwartz, &
Carew, 1997). This led Buxbaum et al. (1997) to distinguish between “what for”
knowledge and “how” knowledge, neither of which is necessarily contingent on the other.
Gerlach et. al (2002) have suggested that the left PMv may act as an interface between
“what for” knowledge and “how” knowledge, damage to which would result in high-level
praxis disorders such as ideational apraxia and conceptual apraxia (e.g. using a
toothbrush like a comb).
Gerlach et. al (2002) reported on a PET study that they interpreted as supporting
this hypothesis. The authors demonstrated that the left PMv was activated for non-living
artefacts compared to living objects in a categorization task, but not in a comparison
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between naming of the same non-living artefacts and living objects. They suggest that the
left PMv was activated during the categorization task and not the naming task because
action knowledge is composed of information regarding the distinctive actions of objects
and the act of categorization is based on an analysis of action equivalence.
This explains why the PMv is activated in the categorization but not the naming
of non-living objects. However, an explanation of why the PMv is activated for non
living objects and not living objects is still required. This relates to the original
sensory/functional hypothesis as proposed by Warrington and McCarthy (1983) which
states that living objects are defined more by their sensory features and non-living objects
are represented more by their functional (or in this case, motoric) features. Because non
living objects are more often manipulable they will be more likely to be partly defined by
motoric features (i.e. how they are manipulated), resulting in activation of the left PMv
during categorization tasks.
Gerlach, Law, and Paulson (2002) tested this latter hypothesis by examining
differential left PMv activation between manipulable and non-manipulable objects. They
found that the left PMv was activated during categorization of both fruits/vegetables and
articles of clothing compared to categorization of animals and non-manipulable non
living objects. This supports the hypothesis that action knowledge is not necessarily
required for the processing of non-living artefacts, but rather for the processing of
manipulable objects. Left PMv activation is observed more during the categorization of
non-living objects than living objects because non-living objects tend to be more
manipulable.
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All o f the above evidence strongly implicates that the left PMv is activated during
the categorization of non-living artefacts. However, this alone is not evidence that left
PMv activation is necessary to successfully categorize non-living objects. Whether the
PMv is necessary for comprehension is extremely important. If it is not necessary for the
comprehension o f non-living artefacts then activation of this area during a categorization
task tells us very little about the presence of category-specific deficits or the organization
of semantic information in the brain. It is entirely possible that the left PMv is activated
simply as a result o f a motor priming effect. As an attempt at controlling for this
possibility Gerlach et. al (2002) had participants perform object decision tasks on the
same fruit/vegetables and articles of clothing that were used in the categorization task.
Only those areas that showed greater activation in the categorization task than in the
object decision task were included in further analysis. Further research is necessary,
however, to adequately control for the possibility of a motor priming effect.
Hope and Buchanan found results supporting the hypothesized role of the PMv in
processing non-living things in an unpublished study in which normal participants were
required to categorize a series of line drawings as living or non-living. The categorization
task was done with and without a distraction task. The distraction task involved
transferring marbles one at time from one bucket to another with the right hand in attempt
to engage the left PMv. The distraction task increased reactions times significantly more
for non-living artefacts than for living things.
The results o f the neuroanatomical studies of category specific deficits for living
and non-living things provide clear evidence for the importance of different structures for
the processing of each category (Table 1). All of the studies reported in this review
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implicate the inferior, anterior, and mesial portions of the temporal lobe for the
processing of living things and the left fronto-tempo-parietal area for the processing of
non-living artefacts. These findings are most consistent with the sensory/functional
hypothesis and the HIT.
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Table 1: Depicts the neuroanatomical regions that are implicated for processing of living
things and non-living things, as well as the studies reporting the findings.

Neuroanatomical
location activated
or injured
Inferior Temporal
Lobe, Fusiform
Gyrus, and/or
Anterior
Temporal Lobe

Left FrontoTemporo-Parietal
Area/ PMv

Study

Living

Gainotti (2000)

X

Gerlach et al. (1999)

X

Whatmough et al.
(2002)
Moore et al. (1999)

X

Non-Living

Theory Supported

HIT,
Sensory/Functional
HIT,
Sensory/Functional
HIT,
Sensory/Functional
HIT,
Sensory/Functional

X

Gainotti (2000)

X

Chao et al. (2000)

X

Gerlach et al. (2000)

X

Gainotti et al. (1995)

X

Gerlach et al. (2002)

X

HIT,
Sensory/Functional
HIT,
Sensory/Functional
HIT,
Sensory/Functional
HIT,
Sensory/Functional
HIT,
Sensory/Functional
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Summary of Theories of Semantic Category Deficits
The dissociation that has been found to occur between knowledge for living and
knowledge for non-living things has generated a vast amount of research aimed at
describing the organization of a semantic system that could accommodate such a pattern
of deficits.
In the sensory/functional hypothesis the dissociation between living and non
living things occurs because the knowledge within these categories has differential
weightings of sensory and functional features. It was initially hypothesized by
Warrington and McCarthy (1984) and later supported by Farah and McClelleand (1991)
that knowledge for living things is composed of a greater number of visual/sensory
features than non-living things which are more reliant on functional information. Thus,
damage to those parts of semantic memory responsible for sensory features will result in
a deficit for living things, whereas damage to functional areas will result in a deficit for
non-living things.
This theory was initially developed because of the finding that the living/non
living dissociation is not pure; that is, gem stones, musical instruments, and food tend to
pattern with living things and body parts tend to pattern with non-living things,
presumably because o f the weighting o f sensory and functional features of these items
(Warrington & McCarthy, 1984; Warrington & Shallice, 1987). This hypothesis has
received the most attention in the literature and arguably the most support. Neuro
anatomical data show that those areas believed to be responsible for the processing of
sensory information are damaged in patients with categorical deficits for living things.
Similarly, those areas believed to be responsible for the processing of motor/functional
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information have been found to be injured in patients with deficits for non-living things
(Gainotti, 2000). The most damaging finding for the sensory/functional hypothesis is that
patients with deficits for living things do not always present with deficient sensory
knowledge of living and non-living things (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998).
Caramazza and colleagues have been the strongest advocates for a truly
categorical organization of semantic memory. They hypothesize that semantic knowledge
for living things and non-living things dissociates because each has a separate
representation within the brain. More specifically, separate neurological structures have
developed through the process of natural selection for knowledge about animals because
they are either potential predators or a potential food source, and for knowledge about
plants as another food source and for medicinal purposes. Later, a separate store for
knowledge about non-living artefacts developed as tool usage became of increased
importance.
This hypothesis is generally supported by the double dissociation between living
and non-living things and the finding that plants and animals often dissociate as well
(Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Farah & Wallace, 1992; Forde et al., 1997). There are few
other testable predictions for the categorical hypothesis and support is usually generated
by reporting results that contradict the predictions of other hypotheses, particularly the
sensory/functional hypothesis.
In the intercorrelations hypothesis the dissociation occurs because of a greater
number of intercorrelated features for living things than for non-living things. Because of
this, any minor damage to the semantic system will result in a deficit for non-living
things because the large number of intercorrelations for living things is protective when
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the damage is minimal. As the damage progresses whole categories of biological items
are lost, resulting in a category-specific deficit for living things.
In this theory category-specific deficits result from diffuse damage as opposed to
more focal lesions. However, there has been very little empirical support for this theory.
Although Gonnerman et al. (1997) reported that a group o f AD patients presented with
deficits for non-living things at early stages of the disease and deficits for living things as
impairment progressed, a number of other studies have shown a pattern of impairment
that does not fit with this model (Garrard et al., 1998; Silveri et al., 1991, Guistolisi et al.,
1993; Whatmough et al., 2003; Zannino et al., 2001). Furthermore, the neuro-anatomical
data do not fit with the predictions of the intercorrelational hypothesis which states that
more extensive damage should result in a larger deficit for living things, while less severe
damage should result in impairment for non-living things. Gainotti (2000) found no
relationship between the severity of damage and the pattern of category-specific semantic
deficit.
In the HIT proposed by Humphreys and Forde (2001) the dissociation between
sensory and functional features of objects is included as well as an elaboration on the
process of object identification. In the HIT account object recognition proceeds through
three distinct stages including recognition of the objects structure, access to semantic
information, and access to the name of the object. Processing can proceed through these
stages in “cascade” meaning that processing can advance to another stage before
processing at a prior stage is complete. This is the essence o f the cascade model in which
processing from a later stage can affect processing at an earlier stage through a feedback
mechanism. Deficits can result from damage to any of the three stages.
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The HIT is better able to accommodate that pattern of deficits that have been
observed clinically than all other theories of category specific deficits. Unlike the
sensory/functional hypothesis, the fact that patients with deficits for living things have
difficulties processing the visual attributes of living things but not of non-living things is
accounted for. Humphreys and Forde (2001) state that the individual identification of
living things is more difficult than for non-living things because of greater visual
crowding. Therefore, in a damaged visual recognition system living things may be
unidentifiable even though the visual processing of non-living things is intact.
In sum, the most widely researched and referenced theory appears to be the
sensory/functional hypothesis which has also been supported by neuro-anatomical
investigations. However, the application of this theory cannot account for all findings
reported in the literature, indicating that the sensory/functional hypothesis may represent
a simplification o f the actual process that results in category-specific deficits. In the HIT
account Humphreys and Forde (2001) build upon the distinction between sensory and
functional features. By doing so they are better able to accommodate all of the available
research findings. This includes the finding that some patients are able to perform object
decision tasks for non-living things but not for living things. The HIT explanation for this
dissociation is that individual identification of living things is more difficult because of
visual crowding. The research reported in this dissertation examines a possible
mechanism by which visual crowding affects object recognition.
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Visual Object Recognition
In the proposed model of semantic category deficits for living things visual
information is viewed as having particular relevance. Subcategories within the category
of living things (as well as the category of musical instruments, foods, and large non
living objects) are visually crowded (they have a high degree of visual similarity between
items within the category) and thus require a more holistic level of processing to
distinguish among members within the subcategories. The processing of these items is
hypothesized to be similar to that required for facial recognition and expert object
recognition. This necessitates a brief discussion of the process of visual object
recognition.
Tarr and Vuong (2002) categorized various theories of object recognition into two
primary approaches: structural description and image-based theories. The structural
description theories are based on the premise that objects are learned by decomposing
them into a collection of three-dimensional parts and then are remembered by the basic
configurations of those parts. Recognition occurs by recovering the three-dimensional
parts from an image and comparing the basic configuration of the parts to those stored in
object memory.
Biederman (1987) proposed a structural description theory called the recognitionby-components (RBC) theory of human image understanding. According to RBC theory,
all objects are perceived by combining approximately 36 volumetric primitives called
geons. These geons are perceived on the basis of highly stable non-accidental image
properties. The term “non-accidental properties” refers to visual images that are unlikely
to have occurred purely by chance. An example of a non-accidental property is three
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edges meeting at a single point as in an “arrow junction” or a “Y junction”. Such a visual
property is much more likely to represent the inside or outside edge of a rectangular
object than to have occurred simply by the chance meeting o f random disconnected lines.
Perception of objects occurs as the non-accidental primitives are translated into
geons which are then combined into a complete configuration referred to as a geonstructural description. The spatial relationships between geons are hypothesized to be
qualitative as opposed to quantitative. This is to satisfy the requirement that identification
of any particular object can occur from multiple views. To identify an object from a
collection of geons from multiple views, the relationships of the geons within a specific
object must be flexible. Thus, the relative positions of the geons within an object are
known, but the spatial relationships between those goens are not quantified. Such a
method of object recognition would have difficulty accounting for expert object
recognition (or the discrimination between the items within living categories), which is
hypothesized to rely on differences in the relationships among features.
In contrast to the structural description models which state that an object is
recognized in the same way from any view, proponents of image-based models
hypothesize that object recognition is actually viewpoint dependent (Tarr and Vuong,
2002). This means that instead of geons that are detected invariably from any view
objects are represented as a collection o f views with each view representing the features
of the object under different viewing conditions (Tarr & Vuong, 2002). Tarr, Williams,
Hayward, and Gauthier (1998) argue that viewpoint dependency requires that as the input
image of the object deviates from the image created when the object was learned, there
are resultant decreases in recognition accuracy and speed, proportional to the amount of
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deviation. The authors were able to show that as images of geons were rotated from 0°, to
45°, to 90° participant’s reaction times on a matching task were increased, supporting the
hypothesis of the image-based model.
Tarr and Bulthoff (1998) propose a model of feature relationships that they
describe as somewhere between completely disordered feature representations and rigid
templates. In this model an object is represented by a local description of the positional
certainty between various features. The relative positions of the features are probabilistic,
meaning that variation within an image is tolerated, but recognition performance will
degrade smoothly as the relative positions of the features deviate further from those in the
originally learned image. The relationships between the features are organized
hierarchically into multiple levels of increasing complexity. Thus, the relationship
between highly associated features at the first level could then be related to other highly
associated features at a second level.
It is difficult for image-based models to accommodate the recognition of
exemplars of a given class or the act of classification within a category, which seems to
require a great deal more flexibility in feature representation and feature relation
(Hummel, 1998). What Tarr and Bultoff (1998) propose is that both image-based and
structural description approaches to object recognition may be used by humans. Which
method is used is dependent on the task characteristics. They suggest that a structural
description may be used when discrimination between shapes only requires a simple
ordering of the object features. An image-based description is more likely to be used
when the relationships between the features are important for discrimination. Such
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relationships are likely necessary for facial recognition, expert object recognition, and as
suggested in the present paper, the identification of certain living things.
Category Specific Deficits as a Type of Visual Agnosia
This dissertation tests an explanation of the semantic category specific deficit for
living items that is based on the hypothesis that category specific deficits for living things
occur because of a specific type of visual agnosia rather than a semantic memory deficit
as is hypothesized in the majority of accounts of category specific deficits (Caramazza &
Shelton, 1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997; Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Tyler et al., 2002;
Warrington & Shallice, 1984).
Humphreys and Riddoch (1987a) described certain agnosic patients (referred to as
integrative visual agnosics) who appear to be unable to integrate the features of objects.
When the relationships are disrupted or are no longer quantifiable, objects that are
dependent on these relationships can no longer be recognized. However, such patients are
able to respond to verbal questions about such objects accurately. Humphreys and
Riddoch (1987a) differentiated this type of agnosia from semantic agnosia and what is
often referred to as associative agnosia. In their model of visual recognition integrative
agnosia represents a disturbance of perception, whereas semantic agnosia occurs because
of damage to the stored representations of objects. The dissociation between living and
non-living things is hypothesized to occur in patients with semantic agnosia.
Humphreys and Riddoch (1987b) proposed that category specific deficits for
living things can occur because living things tend to be more visually crowded than non
living things. Therefore, more detailed visual processing is required to access the stored
representations of living things. What is proposed in the present paper is that some
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instances of category specific deficits for living things represent a type of semantic
agnosia that is category specific because of visual crowding. The explanation for such an
agnosia incorporates elements from the explanation offered for integrative visual agnosia.
The visual processing of living things is hypothesized to partially involve an
analysis of the spatial relationships between the features of the items. The stored
representations of such items are dependent on the quantification o f these relationships.
Therefore, an impaired ability to quantify spatial relationship knowledge will lead to
impaired ability to access stored structural descriptions of living things. The focus is
taken away from the visual features in semantic memory (as in the sensory/functional
hypothesis of Warrington & Shallice, 1984) and is applied to the spatial relationships
between those features in visual perception.
Viewing visual information as a single entity in perception is too simplistic.
Visual information must be further subdivided into elements such as colour, movement,
shape, line orientation, etc. The importance of this has not been lost on previous theories
of semantic memory and has been incorporated into the sensory/functional hypothesis
(Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). What has been largely ignored in the literature on
category specific deficits, however, is the nature of the relationships between whole
features during normal object recognition.
I hypothesize that perception of living and non-living artefacts differs with respect
to the amount of configural processing that is required for members of each category.
Living objects are identified more by holistic processing (an integration of all available
features into a configural representation), whereas non-living artefacts can be more
readily identified by single feature recognition. This configural representation of living

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67
things is represented in an image-based format (Tarr and Vuong, 2002) such that the
spatial relationships between features are quantified. For example, to recognize an item as
a dog you not only need to perceive that it has four legs, ears, fur, a tail, and a torso, but
you have to quantify the relationships among those features in order to differentiate it
from other similar items (i.e. a cat or a donkey). However, recognition of a shirt can be
done simply by recognizing the presence of sleeves.
The integrative requirement of many living objects comes from the fact that these
items tend to have more visual overlap than other non-living items, which is the basis of
the visual crowding hypothesis (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987b). Based on this, one
would predict that an individual with a deficit for living things would not have difficulties
identifying the super-ordinate category of “animal” because an integration of all visual
features is not required. This has been repeatedly found (Riddoch & Humphreys, 2004).
If a patient can identify a leg, then it must be an animal. This is also supported by studies
of normal populations which show that subjects have greater difficulty naming living
objects under time constraints, but show better performance naming super-ordinate
categories under time constraints or degraded viewing conditions (Humphreys et al.,
1998; Moore & Price, 1999).
Patients with deficits that are labelled as being specific to living objects have a
tendency to have deficient knowledge for other specific non-living artefacts as well. For
instance, numerous studies have reported on patients with a “living things” deficit that
also have deficits for musical instruments, food, large non-living objects, and faces
(Gainotti, 2000; Saumier, Arguin, & Lassonde, 2001; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983;
1987; 1994; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). What all of these categories appear to have in
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common is that the members are visually crowded. Therefore, to distinguish between
those members one must rely on the relationships among the various features.
The super-ordinate category of musical instruments has many sub-categories with
very visually similar items (i.e. members of the brass, woodwind, and reed instruments).
The same can be said for food items (i.e. different cuts and types of meat and different
vegetables) and for large man-made objects (i.e. different types of buildings, automobiles,
and furniture). Thus, an inability to quantify the relationships between visual features
would be expected to result in deficits for living items, foods, musical instruments, faces,
and large man-made objects, as well as any other items that require a high degree of
visual feature integration to distinguish between members of that category.
Non-living artefacts such as clothing, on the other hand, would seem to require
less integration of visual elements to distinguish between members. Although a sweater is
visually similar to other articles of clothing with sleeves and a hole for the head, such
items are fairly limited (except for a clothing “expert”). A sweater is quite distinct from
most articles o f clothing, such as pants or a hat. Therefore, identification does not require
a detailed analysis of the relationships between its features. Articles of clothing can
instead be recognized from a single visual element such as the presence of a sleeve.
The following experiments were focussed on testing the hypothesis that animals
are distinguished from one another based on the relationships among features (configural
processing) because of increased visual crowding. Participant’s reaction times (RT)’s on
identification tasks were analyzed in response to images in which the relationships among
features were disrupted by picture inversion. Picture inversion has been used extensively
in the study of prosopagnosia as an indicator of configural processing (see discussion).
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Comparisons were made between response time increases from inversion between
animals and clothing.
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants were asked to quickly and accurately indicate whether a picture
matched a printed word that preceded it. Half of the pictures were animal items and half
were clothing items. Each participant responded to each picture once in an upright
position and once in an inverted position. The pictures were presented in random order
with “Direct RT” software.
The category of animals was selected because of the high degree of visual overlap
between members of this category (Humphreys et al., 1988). Clothing items were used
because this category is often differentiated from animals on clinical testing, they are less
visually crowded, and they have a canonical orientation. The proposed model gives rise
to the prediction o f a main effect of inversion because of a combination of the disruption
to feature identification and the disruption of the relationships between features. Further,
this effect should interact with Category reflecting the fact that response times to the
inverted animals would be increased to a greater extent than would response times to
inverted clothing. This is based on the hypothesis that living items are identified by the
relationships among features, whereas non-living objects can be identified by single
features.
Method
Participants
Participants were 30 right-handed undergraduate students from the University of
Windsor, ranging in age from 18 to 40 who volunteered for the study for course credit.
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Materials and Procedure
Participants were asked to indicate whether a line drawing represented the same
object as a word that immediately preceded it. The participants were then instructed that
they were going to perform several practice trials before beginning the test trials. Thirty
practice trials were conducted in which the participants were instructed to indicate
whether the line drawing matched the word that preceded by pressing “ 1” for match and
“2” for non-match on a standard computer keyboard. They were told that the pictures
may be inverted or upright and to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Following the practice trials the participants began the test trials. Each participant
responded to 72 picture-word pairs, 36 of which represented animals and 36 of which
represented items of clothing. They were given the same instructions as during the
practice trials.
There were 18 pictures o f animals and 18 pictures of items o f clothing. Each
picture was presented once in the upright position and once in the inverted position. All
of the pictures were presented in random order. Half of the 18 animals and the 18 articles
of clothing were paired with a matching word and the other half of the pictures were
paired with non-matching words. Half of the participants responded to one half of the 18
items as non-matching and the other half of the participants responded to the other half of
the items as non-matching.
All of the non-matching words were taken from the same category as the picture
that followed them. For example, for both the practice and experimental trials the words
were presented on the screen for 250 ms, were followed by a 500 ms interstimulus
interval (ISI), which was followed by the picture for 250ms. The screen remained blank
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until a response was made. Each response was followed by a 1000 ms intertrial interval
(ITI). The general procedure of a single trial is illustrated in Figure 1. The line drawings
were taken from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1983). The drawings were presented on a
PC monitor with a black background, approximately 60 cm in front of the participants.
The pictures were presented and the RT’s recorded with “Direct RT” software.
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Figure 1: Illustrates the task sequence and the duration of each part of the sequence. The
word is first presented for 250 ms, followed by an ISI of 500 ms during which time the
screen is blank, followed by the picture for 250 ms, immediately followed by the
response phase, during which time the screen remained blank until a response was made.
Each trial was separated by a 1000 ms ITI during which time the screen remained blank.
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1000 ms ITI

Results
Outliers with RTs greater than 1500 ms were eliminated from the analysis per the
recommendations of Ratcliff (1993) to maximize the power of the analysis. After removal
of outlier RTs greater than 1500 ms, correct RTs were entered into a two-way repeated
measures ANOVA. The factors were Category with two levels (animals and clothing) and
Picture Orientation also with two levels (inverted and upright). There was a main effect
o f Picture Orientation, F ( l , 29) = 39.472,/? < .001, and Category, F ( 1, 29) - 4.311,/? =
.047. There was an interaction between Picture Orientation and Category, F (1,29) =
4.581,/? = .041 with longer RTs for inverted pictures and a greater inversion effect for
animals than for clothing (Figure 2).
An error analysis was performed using a chi-square test. There was no effect of
category x2 (1) - 2.105,/? = .156, or of inversion x2 (1) ~ .896,/? = .344 on the error rates.
The overall error rate was 3.4 %.
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Figure 2: Presents the mean RTs (ms) with error bars (95% confidence intervals) for
participants to indicate whether a picture matched the word that preceded it. Each bar
represents a different picture condition: Animal Upright (n = 30) (where “n” refers to the
number of subjects); Animal Inverted (n = 30); Clothing Upright (n = 30); and Clothing
Inverted (n = 30).
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EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment participants were required to categorize the same set of pictures
that were matched to words in Experiment 2. A categorization task was chosen because it
was assumed that the relationships among the features would only be necessary to
distinguish animals at an individual level. Thus, at a categorical level visual crowding is
no longer an issue for animals and they can be distinguished based on simple feature
identification. Therefore, unlike Experiment 1, it was predicted that RTs for the animals
would be equal to or faster than the RTs for the clothin items that were presented in both
the upright and inverted orientation.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 30 right-handed undergraduate students from the University of
Windsor, ranging in age from 18 to 40 who volunteered for the study for course credit.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were asked to indicate whether a line drawing represented a living or
a man-made item. The participants were then instructed that they were going to perform
several practice trials before beginning the test trials. Thirty practice trials were
conducted in which the participants were instructed to indicate whether the line drawing
represented a living or a man-made item by pressing “1” for living and “2” for manmade. They were told that the pictures may be inverted or upright and to respond as
quickly and as accurately as possible.
Participants responded to the same pictures used in Experiment 1 presented under
identical conditions, for the same duration.
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Results
The correct RTs were subjected to a two-way repeated measures ANOVA.
Outliers greater than two standard deviations from the mean of all RT’s were removed
from the data set. The factors were Category with two levels (animals and clothing) and
Picture Orientation also with two levels (inverted and upright). There was a main effect
of Picture Orientation, F (1, 29) = 7.793, p = .009 and Category, F (1, 29) = 8.427, p .007. The interaction between Picture Orientation and Category was not significant, F (1,
29) = .879, p = .356 (Figure 3). The RTs were longer when the pictures were inverted and
when they were pictures of clothing. Unlike the picture-word matching task, RTs were
not significantly longer for inverted animals than for inverted clothes.
An error analysis was performed using a chi-square test. There was no effect of
category %2 (1) = .258,/? = .612, or of inversion %2 (1) = .064,/? = .800 on the error rates.
The overall error rate was 2.9 %.
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Figure 3: Presents the mean RTs (ms) with error bars (95% confidence intervals) for the
participants to indicate whether a picture represented a living or a non-living item. Each
bar represents a different picture condition: Animal Upright (n = 30); Animal Inverted (n
= 30); Clothing Upright (n = 30); and Clothing Inverted (n = 30).
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EXPERIMENT 3
In this experiment participants were again asked to state whether a set of animals
and a set of man-made objects matched words that preceded them, thereby requiring that
they be identified at an individual level. The animals used in this experiment were the
same as those used in Experiment 1, but instead of using clothing, the non-living items
were selected from categories that were believed to be more visually crowded. The non
living items used were vehicles, furniture, and buildings. These categories were chosen
because of their assumed visual crowding that would require differentiation based on the
spatial relationships of their features. The proposed model results in the prediction that
these non-living items would be processed in a similar way to the living items, thereby
nullifying the interaction observed in Experiment 1.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 30 right-handed undergraduate students from the University of
Windsor, ranging in age from 18 to 40 who volunteered for the study for course credit.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedures were identical to those used in Experiment 1 except
that the man-made items used were selected from the sub-categories of vehicles,
furniture, and buildings. All of the non-matching words were taken from the same sub
categories.
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Results
The correct RTs were subjected to a two-way repeated measures ANOVA. All
RTs greater than 1500 ms were removed from the data set. The factors were Category
with two levels (animals.and non-living items) and Picture Orientation also with two
levels (inverted and upright). There was a main effect of Picture Orientation, F ( \ , 29) =
41.753, p <.001, but not of Category, F ( l , 29) = .797, p - .379. There was no interaction
between Picture Orientation and Category, F (1,29) = 3 56 , p = .555 (Figure 4). The RTs
were longer when the pictures were inverted. Unlike the results of Experiment 1, RTs
were not increased more for the living items when they were inverted compared to the
inverted non-living items (Figure 5).
An error analysis was performed using a chi-square test. There was an effect of
category x2 (1) = 12.857, p = .000, but not of inversion x2 (1) = .400, p = .527 on the error
rates. The overall error rate was 4.4 %.
A repeated measures ANOVA was completed with the RT data from Experiments
1 and 3, with the Experiment (1 and 3) as a between subjects variable. Outliers were
removed at 1500ms. There was an effect of Experiment, F ( \ , 58) = 5.483,/? = .023,
reflecting faster overall reaction times in Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 1. There
was an interaction between Experiment and Category, F (1, 58) = 4.782, p = .033.
Neither the Experiment and Orientation, F (1, 58) = .129,/? = .721, nor the Experiment,
Category, and Orientation, F ( l , 58) = 1.042,/? = .312 interactions approached statistical
significance.
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Figure 4: Presents the mean RTs with error bars (95% confidence intervals) for the
participants to indicate whether a picture matched the word that preceded it. Each bar
represents a different picture condition: Animal Upright (n = 30); Animal Inverted (n =
30); Non-living Upright (n = 30); and Non-living Inverted (n = 30). The animal items
were the same as those used in Experiment 1, but instead of clothing, items were selected
from vehicles, furniture, and buildings.
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Figure 5: Presents the mean RTs with error bars (95% confidence intervals) shown in
Figure 1 and Figure 3 included in a single figure. The different picture conditions include
Animal Upright, Animal Inverted, Non-living Upright and Non-living Inverted.
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DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 were consistent with the predictions of the hypothesis
that identifying individual living things is more dependent on the relationships between
features than is the identification of non-living things. The RT’s were increased by
picture inversion for both categories, but to a greater extent for the animals. According to
the proposed model, the increase in RT’s for the animals occurred because of a disruption
to the known relationships between the features of such items, in addition to the
disruption caused by feature inversion. The increase in RT’s for the clothing, on the other
hand, was more limited to the effects of the disruption to feature detection because
quantitative knowledge o f the relationships between features is not necessary for
differentiation of items within this category.
An alternative explanation is that the animals are more difficult to recognize
because of some confounding factor such as visual complexity or a greater number of
features in living things. If the recognition of animals requires processing of a greater
number of features and we predict that inversion also effects feature recognition, then
inversion would be expected to affect animals more, simply because more inverted
features need to be processed. However, this is not supported by the RT’s for the pictures
in the upright orientation which were equal for animals and clothing (actually faster for
animals, but the difference was not statistically significant).
It still seems possible that a difference between the stimulus properties of the
categories could account for the differences rather than the processing differences
required to distinguish between members of the two categories. To control for this, in
Experiment 2 a group o f participants performed a categorization task with the same set of
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stimuli used in Experiment 1 in both the upright and inverted orientations. Again,
inversion increased the response times across both categories of items. In contrast to
Experiment 1, however, inversion of the pictures did not increase RT’s more for animals
than for clothing. This is not consistent with the suggestion that the interaction found in
Experiment 1 was the result of general stimulus differences between the two categories,
but indicates that the processing of animals in Experiment 1 was different from the
processing of clothing.
The proposed model results in the prediction that the interaction observed in
Experiment 1 would not occur during a categorization task because configural processing
of the items is only required to differentiate between the highly similar members of
animals at an individual level. At the categorical level animals need only to be
differentiated from clothing and this can be done by simple feature detection.
Animals were categorized faster than clothing in both the upright and inverted
conditions. This provides support for the visual crowding hypothesis that states that
categorization proceeds quickly for living things because there is greater overlap of the
features of living things (Humphreys and Riddoch, 1987).
An important element of the current hypothesis that differentiates it from
hypotheses of semantic category deficits that emphasize a categorical organization of
semantic memory is that other objects that belong to categories that are visually crowded
will tend to be processed in a manner that is similar to that for animals. In Experiment 3
the inversion effect for animals observed in Experiment 1 was contrasted to a group of
non-living things that were believed to come from more visually crowded categories.
Because of this, it was hypothesized that the interaction that was observed in Experiment
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1 would not occur in Experiment 3. The results of testing showed an effect of inversion
for both animals and for the non-living things, in the absence of an interaction between
category and inversion, confirming the original hypothesis.
In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2 in which there was no effect of category or
inversion on error rates the results of Experiment 3 revealed higher error rates for the
non-living things. Based on these findings it could be argued that the non-living things
used in Experiment 3 were more visually difficult to process than the animals and this is
why inversion caused increased reaction times, rather than the configural processing of
such items. However, this is not consistent with the observation that the number of errors
actually decreased when the non-living things were inverted.
An analysis of the RTs across Experiments 1 and 3 revealed significantly faster
RTs during Experiment 3. This was true for both the new set of non-living items and for
the identical set of animals used in Experiment 1. Because RTs were also faster for the
“animals” category this is likely the result of the characteristics of the sample rather than
an effect of experimental variables.
In sum, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the animals used were
processed in a more holistic fashion compared with clothes. Furthermore, the categories
of furniture, vehicles, and buildings appeared to be processed in a similar manner to
animals. However, the conclusion that animals are processed more holistically is
dependent on the hypothesis that inversion affects holistic processing. Evidence for this
comes from research into prosopagnosia which is discussed in the following section.
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Prosopagnosia, Expert Object Identification, and Living Things
The explanation of deficits for living things provided in the present paper is
similar to theories offered to explain the deficits of patients with prosopagnosia. Such
patients are believed to have difficulties with “holistic” processing or “configural”
processing (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998). Patients with prosopagnosia will
often describe their experience of face perception as seeing the parts individually and
losing the whole or the gestalt (Farah, 2004). Although there are a number of different
theories elaborating on the process of configural processing the majority of researchers
agree that faces are processed more holistically than other objects (Farah et al., 1998). In
all elaborations of configural processing the relationships among features are considered
paramount for accurate perception, as is proposed in this paper.
Farah, Tanaka, and Drain (1995) tested whether the holistic representation of
faces could explain the face inversion effect. The “face inversion effect” is the term used
to describe the difficulty that normal individuals have recognizing inverted faces. Farah et
al., (1995) taught participants to identify random dot patterns and then tested their ability
to recognize the patterns either upright or inverted. Half of the patterns were presented in
a manner that encouraged part-based representations. This was done by having each part
made up of a distinctive colour. The other half of the patterns were presented with all dots
being black, thereby encouraging a holistic representation. All of the test patterns were
presented in black. Testing revealed no effect o f orientation for the patterns that had been
encoded in a part-based manner, but a significant inversion effect for those that were
represented holistically.
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In a second experiment, participants learned to recognize a set of faces. Again,
half of the faces were learned in a part-wise manner and half were learned holistically. To
encourage part-wise encoding half of the faces were presented in an “exploded” form,
such that the parts of the faces were presented separately. The other half of the faces were
presented normally. All o f the faces were then tested in a normal format. There was only
an inversion effect for the faces that were learned normally. The inversion effect was
absent when the faces were learned part-wise. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that the inversion effect is the result of a disruption to holistic processing and
supports the current conclusions that living things are processed more holistically.
The inversion effect is not unique to face recognition, but has been observed
under conditions requiring expert object recognition as well, suggesting that holistic
processing is important for both tasks. Expert recognition refers to the differentiation of
visually similar items within a category by an individual that has a great deal of
experience with that category. For instance, Diamond and Carey (1986) showed that dog
recognition by dog experts was sensitive to inversion effects that were comparable in
magnitude to the face inversion effect. In contrast, non-dog experts showed only a face
inversion effect in the absence of a dog inversion effect. The authors argued that the
holistic processing of faces is actually a specific instance of expert object recognition and
any other items that are processed “expertly” will be processed holistically.
Further support for the hypothesis that expert object identification relies on
holistic processing comes from two studies performed by de Gelder and colleagues. De
Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, and Degos (1998) found that normal subjects produced an
inversion effect for both faces and a set of subtly different shoes. Shoes were chosen
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because they tend to be highly visually similar, but have a number o f different exemplars.
Also, much like faces, shoes have a canonical orientation, de Gelder and Rouw (2000)
extended these findings with a prosopagnosic patient who showed an “inverted inversion
effect” for the set of faces and the set of shoes. The inverted inversion effect refers to the
improved learning and recognition of items that are presented inverted in patients with
prosopagnosia. This is believed to occur because the holistic processing module is
engaged when the item is presented upright even though that module is damaged (Farah,
2004).
Guathier and Tarr (1997) specifically tested the effects of expert object processing
by training a group of participants to discriminate “greebles”. They examined whether
such participants who were trained to discriminate one set of pictures of greebles would
then show configural processing of a new set of unfamiliar greebles. “Greebles” are
digitally created three-dimensional objects each with four protruding parts organized in
approximately the same configuration. Each greeble was a member of one of two genders
and one of five families. The five families were defined by a different central part shape.
The genders were differentiated by the orientation of the other parts relative to the central
part. Although some of the parts were very similar to each other, each was unique to the
individual greeble. The authors reported that their group of greeble experts were slower
to identify the parts of novel greebles when those parts were in a different configuration
than during training. This was only the case for greebles presented in the upright
orientation. Novice identification of parts was not sensitive to the configuration used
during the study phase. These results suggest that the “experts” had learned a configural
representation of the parts of the greebles similar to that observed in facial recognition.
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Gautheir, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, and Gore (1999) provided further support
for the hypothesis that holistic face processing is simply an example of expert object
recognition by examining activity in the fusiform face area (FFA) during processing of
greebles and faces. To do this the authors examined the difference in FFA activity on
fMRI between upright and inverted faces and between upright and inverted greebles.
Prior to training there was a greater difference in FFA activity between upright and
inverted faces than between upright and inverted greebles. Following training with
greebles (and with faces as a control condition) the difference in activity in the FFA
between matching o f upright greebles versus matching of inverted greebles increased
dramatically. This area was also more activated in passive viewing of greebles by experts
than by novices. It was concluded that expertise is one factor that encourages activation
in the FFA.
The results of the current experiments suggest that the individual identification of
animals requires more holistic processing than the individual identification of clothes.
Furthermore, other objects that come from visually crowded categories may also be
processed holistically as indicated by the significant effect of inversion for buildings,
vehicles, and furniture. This form of processing may be similar to that observed for shoes
(de Gelder et al., 1998), expert dog identification (Diamond and Carey, 1986), and expert
greeble identification (Gauthier and Tarr, 1997). The processing o f visually crowded
categories may be an example o f expert object processing.
Research mentioned in the introduction of this paper also supports the hypothesis
that living things are processed by regions of the brain that have been implicated in the
expert object recognition research discussed above. Gerlach et al. (1999) found that larger
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parts of the right inferior temporal and anterior fusiform gyri were recruited for living
objects compared to artefacts. Whatmough et al. (2002) reported that naming of animals
compared with the naming of tools was associated with increased regional Cerebral
Blood Flow (rCBF) in the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri bilaterally. Moore and
Price (1999) found that naming of living objects compared to naming of non-living
artefacts resulted in increased rCBF in the posterior portion of the right middle temporal
gyrus and the anterior temporal lobes. In a meta-analysis Gainotti (2000) found that
deficits for living things were associated with inferior temporal lobe damage, in contrast
to deficits for non-living things which were associated with ffonto-temporo-parietal
lesions. All of the above findings are consistent with the hypothesis that living objects are
more visually similar and are processed more holistically than are non-living things.
Semantic Deficit or Visual Agnosia?
The results of the current experiments in conjunction with the literature on the
anatomical processing of living things provides strong evidence in favour of the
hypothesis that living things are processed more holistically than are non-living things.
Furthermore, it seems likely that this is the result of the visual crowding of the category
of living things (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987). It is difficult for the current results to be
accommodated by many of the prevailing theories of category specific deficits because
they focus on damage to “semantic memory” as the locus of the deficits and were not
intended to address the perceptual processing of objects. However, for this same reason
the results do not refute any of the hypotheses regarding the organization of semantic
memory.
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The results are best interpreted within the visual crowding hypothesis and provide
a possible mechanism by which visual crowding affects the process of differentiating
between objects. It is possible to incorporate this mechanism within the HIT account
(Humphreys & Forde, 2001), much like the visual crowding hypothesis has been. Within
this model the re-entrant activation of visual processing would be represented by entry
into a “holistic processing module” which would only be required to differentiate
between living things and other items from visually crowded categories. Damage to this
area would then lead to a category specific deficit for living things.
It is clear that any model explaining category specific deficits will have to account
for differences in holistic processing between categories. Research indicates that areas of
the fusiform gyrus may be necessary for such processing to take place and, therefore, any
damage to this area is likely to result in deficits processing those objects that require
holistic processing to be differentiated.
The question remains as to whether a holistic processing deficit can account for
the deficits observed in patients with a dissociation between their knowledge for living
and non-living things. It is possible that for certain living items an inability to
differentiate individual items visually would result in a loss of all “semantic” information
for those items as well. For instance, animals may be differentiated almost entirely based
on their subtly different visual features for most individuals. Therefore, if they cannot be
differentiated at the visual level they cannot be differentiated semantically. In contrast, an
individual may differentiate people based on their face, their voice, and their relationship
to that individual. If this individual is no longer able to differentiate faces because of a
holistic processing deficit this will result in prosopagnosia, but all knowledge of people
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they have relationships with will not be lost because of the intact connections to voice
information and relationship information that can also be used to differentiate individuals.
This provides a reasonable explanation for why prosopagnosia and “semantic” category
deficits for living things are so highly correlated (Farah, 2004).
Thomas and Forde (2006) recently came to a similar conclusion in their
examination of a patient with a category specific deficit for living things. This patient was
faster at identifying local compared to global letters (letters made up of smaller letters)
and showed no local-to-global or global-to-local interference effects in a selective
attention task. From this the authors hypothesized that it was this difficulty processing
visual information globally that resulted in the patient’s category specific deficit for
living things.
This hypothesis allows for variability in the presentation of deficits resulting from
an inability to process the spatial relationships among details depending on the
individuals learning history. For instance, some individuals may present with only a
visual agnosia for living things if they have adequate connections in other modalities to
distinguish between individual items (i.e. verbal, auditory, gustatory, tactile, or motor).
Such patients have been identified in the literature (Arguin, Bub, & Dudek, 1996;
Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987).
This is not to say that all reports of category specific deficits for living things can
be accounted for by this mechanism. Although such patients are rare, De Renzi and
Lucchelli (1994) have reported on a patient with deficient knowledge for living things
with intact face recognition abilities.
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Humphreys and Forde (2001) distinguished between two types of patients with
deficits for living things that have been described in the literature. One type, such as the
patient reported on by Caramazza and Shelton (1998), has an inability to perform
accurately on an object decision task for living things in addition to deficits for living
things on tasks presented in various modalities. This is the type o f patient that, according
to the present model, would also present with difficulties with face recognition.
Humphreys and Forde argue that this type of patient has difficulties distinguishing
between visually similar items because of a disruption to the process of re-entrant
activation. Such a patient could also be conceptualized as having an impaired ability to
process the configural relationships in visual object identification.
Another type, such as the patient described by Laiacona et al. (1997), has deficits
for living things with an intact ability to perform object decision tasks. Humphreys and
Forde (2001) argue that this type of patient has category specific damage at the semantic
level, as opposed to the visual recognition level. The difficulty with classifying patients
as having a “semantic” deficit because of intact object recognition is that intact object
recognition may not, in fact, equate to intact configural processing abilities. Individual
object identification is likely to require a more fine grained analysis of the visual
properties of an object than is required for object decision tasks. Furthermore, object
decision tasks will very greatly from study to study based on the different parts that have
been connected to create non-objects. Perhaps a more accurate test of configural
processing abilities would be a test of facial recognition.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93
CONCLUSIONS
The results of the current study indicate that living things are processed more by
their holistic configuration than are non-living artefacts. Such processing is hypothesized
to be similar to that observed for facial recognition and expert object recognition and
requires the application o f an image-based processing model (Tarr & Vuong, 2002).
Given these findings it is possible that prior instances of category-specific deficits for
living things have resulted from an inability to process the spatial relationships between
the features of living things. Previous research suggests that this may be because of the
increased visual crowding of living things (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987b). The results
of this study support this hypothesis, showing that other types of non-living artefacts that
are more visually crowded can also be affected by disruption to the configural
relationships that differentiate the items. The fact that prosopagnosia is so highly
correlated with category-specific deficits for living things supports this hypothesis.
The reverse pattern of deficits, category specific deficits for non-living artefacts,
is not addressed by these results. However, research suggests that action knowledge is
particularly important for processing this category of items (Gerlach et al., 2002).
Future investigations of patients with category specific deficits for living things
must be careful to examine the visual processing abilities of such individuals, particularly
with respect to configural processing. The object decision task may not be entirely
sensitive to deficits of configural processing depending on the nature of the “non-objects”
that are created. Perhaps a more accurate indication of configural processing abilities
would be a test o f facial recognition.
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APPENDIX A: Stimulus set
Animals
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APPENDIX B: ANOVA tables for each experiment
Experiment 1
Effect

F-vaiue

Significance

E ta Squared

Category

(1,29) = 4.31

.047

.129

Orientation

(1,29) = 39.47

.000

.576

Category * Orientation

(1,29) = 4.58

.041

.136

Effect

F-value

Significance

E ta Squared

Category

(1,29) = 8.43

.007

.225

Orientation

(1,29) = 7.79

.009

.212

Category * Orientation

(1,29) = .88

.356

.029

Effect

F-value

Significance

E ta Squared

Category

(1,29) = .80

.379

.027

Orientation

(1,29) = 41.75

.000

.590

Category * Orientation

(1,29) = .36

.555

.012

Experiment 2

Experiment 3
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Experiments 1 and 3 Interactions
Effect

F-value

Significance

Eta Squared

Category * Experiment

(1,58) = 4.78

.033

.076

Orientation * Experiment

(1,58) = .129

.721

.002

Category * Orientation *

(1 ,58)= 1.04

.312

.018

Experiment
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